Part LXXXVIII: Transformation through Re-Self-Organization!
Consilence: Evidence and Verification (Within and Across Disciplines?)?
Part I: The Theoretical Determination of Apparent Work*
0. Preamble
In a discipline what is seen as ‘evidence’ and its ‘verification’ (either as self-evidential or other-evidential) is predetermined in the light of the genres that orchestrate that discipline. Hence, e.g., scientific evidence and scientific verification, theological evidence and theological verification, sociological evidence and sociological verification, philosophical evidence and philosophical verification, transcendental-phenomenological evidence and transcendental-phenomenological verification, etc., etc. Suffice to say that what is evidential and verficational in one discipline need not be acceptable in another and v.v. Just what is evidential about the evidential and just what is verified in claims of verification? In this essay-paper let me look at such issues and how this plethora of disciplines could also disvalue the very concepts of a discipline, just what is evidential and how is such evidence to find an acceptable form of verification across a number of disciplines? To what extent can the semblance of consilience, in some form or other, be rescued from the apparent anarchy of such overall ‘ill-disciplined’ scholarship, etc? (0)
1. Introduction
First, I will exam the phenomenological nature of a ‘discipline’ in general, particular and specific terms of reference. (1)
Second, I will investigate the phenomenological nature of ‘evidence’ and the verification of the same discipline’ in general, particular and specific terms of reference. (2)
Third, I will explore in what manner disciplines can be interrelated and evidential claims, etc., can and cannot be both made and allowed to cross disciplines in a commensurate fashion?
(3)
From such understandings, along with a general phenomenological appreciation of the process of judgment, I will argue for a position of qualified consilience on a deeper level of epistemological functioning in order to arrive at some degree of accommodation when and where that is possible regardless of whether this disciplinary harmonization is fruitfully productive in the formation of value or not? (4)
In a series of provisional conclusions I will review a number of themes and topics raised in the course of this essay-paper (and briefly re-examine the theoretical determination of work enacted within a discipline or between disciplines). (5)
*Latest version: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage4.html
1. The Nature of a Discipline?
Disciplines come in many shapes and sizes with varying degrees of ‘discipline’. Without discrimination let be give a dozen examples: science, astrology, medicine, theology, sociology, psychology, mathematics, history, transcendental phenomenology, Freudian psychology, gastronomy, tax law, etc., etc. What could possibly unite this set and other disciplines as ‘disciplines’ per se? (6)
As a provisional response to this rhetorical question let me suggest the following under three interrelated headings: a basis premise that the domain of the discipline in question deals with truth, and, there is evidence for this perception of truth, and, means to verify this semblance of the evidential. (7)
In this essay-paper let me examine this proposal, titled as a basic premise, namely, that the domain of a discipline attempts to deal with truth, rightly or wrongly, as perceived through the discipline of that domain. (8)
On transcendental grounds that the Life-World encompasses one world-for-us, and, only one world, that being granted, then it follows that all disciplines should be commensurable to some degree regardless of whether such commensuration is worth the effort invested in establishing an accommodation between a certain set of disciplines or, more broadly, all disciplines in general. In this essay-paper this is a second major theme for exploration within this topic. (9)
What characterizes a discipline? Those elements it constructs as befitting its domain, and, what elements are excluded from that domain (if only through neglect1). This characterization being exercised by the requisite meta-textual genres exercised by that discipline, and, just as much, define that discipline (through the rules it exercises). A discipline utilizes a discourse in either a passive and/or active sense. Either describing that domain’s states of affairs or prescribing states of affairs within the same. Genre rules being used to manipulate elements in that domain and, therein, form relationships between the same and with that overall domain itself. (10)
Each specific discipline has an implicit and/or explicit specific basic premise. E.g., in a theological discipline we would assume, more than likely, that the basic premise is that “the divine exists”. That theological work would be done by a theologian in limiting that domain through definition, and default, introducing its elements, their relationships, the rules of the discipline, what counts as evidential, what counts as ‘verification’ and what counts as ‘truth’, and, therein, establishing the general tenor of its topicality, etc. Although fashion can dictate what types of propositions are more likely to be considered, etc. (11)
‘Evidence’ and ‘Verification’?
What is evidential and what counts as verification?? (12)
There are numerous disciplines and an even greater number of discourses associated with the same. A number of key discourses fall within certain disciplines and some of them might even straddle a number of disciplines in the form of inter-disciplinary discourses. Practitioners of a discipline, as exponents of various discourses, fall within a discipline or between disciplines on a spectrum from professional to amateur in status. Being professional in a discipline comes with the recognition afforded by the recognized institution/s of that discipline that the practitioner in question has mastered the technical aspects of that discipline in a professional manner. Such politically organized power-structures are either open or closed to professionals, aspiring professionals and/or amateurs. An ambition to become a professional or operate on a professional-like level of expertise is realistic to the degree that some professionals have already attained such standards (and some actually get paid). In this sense such expectations are realistic (regardless of the mental and psychological abilities of a specific individual as to whether they are capable or incapable of attaining that professional level of expertise and status). In contrast, aspirations to attain a high level of expertise may be too idealistic given that the basic premise of a discipline may not be able to be revealed in a substantial manner if at all. Regardless of the obtainability or non-obtainability of such an objective, traversing some of the way along this endless path should not be without some degree of value even if in a comparative assessment with some other discipline such a delivery of value might seem to be relatively profitless. In the light of this background vignette let us examine how a discipline must decide whether its basic premise may or may not be able to be revealed under normal circumstances. In situations where there is a lack of the revelation of the objective how might we account for evidential and verificational relationships given this apparent inability or deferment to address the so-called reality of such an objective? Normally, one would think such a discipline would be either abandoned or seriously re-worked? However, institution may evolve over time they do not usually abdicate a position of power within the world of institutions and may seriously insulate themselves from such a critique. (13)
Just as professional blacksmiths and coopers have almost faded away (except for a few souls who wish to carry on such pursuits) in the goodness of time many current institutions in their own way must evolve or pass away. However, let it be safe to say that the basic premise of each and every discipline cannot be absolutely obtained! Let me demonstrate this point; if only analogically. (14)
We could say to an historian – the subject matter of your topic has completely disappeared given that the past has passed away and is now no longer with us… An historian would dispute this and claim that we have various forms of hermeneutic access to intentionally deposited texts that allows us to run various theses concerning that reconstructed sense of the past. (15)
Or, a well respected theologian could be asked “why be a theologian when you merely believe that ‘God exists’, not having adequately demonstrated the objective reality of your topic to the satisfaction of say an atheist or a person who finds they are losing their faith in such matter, e.g?” Then, a whole host of other topics, often associated in a theology, like the existence of souls, life after death, sin, heaven, hell, etc., also seem to lack any substantial basis whatsoever. That ‘God’ has nothing to say about science, and, science has nothing to say about ‘God’…! (16)
Or, a physicist might be remonstrated with along the same lines. It could be argued that they tell us about many wonderful things but often neglect to expose the pragmatic difficulties of integrating quantum theory with the theory of relativity. Then, even though that is a considerable scandal, they have yet to satisfy the scientific community that they have to date seriously detailed more than five percent of the astrophysical universe when it comes to such speculative topics like dark matter and dark energy, etc. In effect, the physicist, currently, can only discuss less than five percent of our universe. Such a scandal, surpassing even that associated with philosophers and their inability to paint a broader picture of this world as lived. Even philosophers can reach considerable degrees of consensus otherwise every argument would not be able to begin let alone be argued in the first place (although aspects of their basic premise, as in all disciplines, can only find relative, provisional forms of resolution through such consensual concurrence?). (17)
Or, what about the discipline of traffic controllers, e.g., attempting to ensure our congested roads can run more smoothly. Such ‘turbulence’ experienced in flows of traffic is a chaotic phenomenon and as such there are times when no amount of linear calculation is going to help us to decide what is going to happen about such points of bifurcation (other than perhaps in a probabilistic manner). Consequently, road closures, peak hour traffic pile-ups and other adverse factors that might be slowing down the traffic will escape accurate prediction and accurate future quantification. (18)
Is the mathematician free from such embarrassment? No longer, given a succession of eminent mathematicians have decided and proved that closed systems cannot be rendered completely systematic, find full truth determination, can be completely explicated, etc. (19)
The collective moral to be drawn from these anecdotes is that the basic premise of a discipline is absolutely unobtainable whether it is scientific or historical, whether astronomical or astrological, theological or mathematical, etc. So, in the light of this claim, how is evidence about a discipline’s basic premise to be evidentially arranged and verified? (20)
Some people would argue that you can never compare, e.g., chalk with cheese. That what is incommensurable is incommensurable. On the other hand, the sheer existence of this bewildering plethora of disciplines must have some form of existential value otherwise their historical persistence could not endure. But, as already noted, a large number of professionals actually get paid to do what they do and we must seriously ask “why, or, how?” (21)
Take our controllers of the traffic worried about flows along the highways, over bridges and through tunnels; observing common points of congestion; attempting to ensure people can get to and from work in the most efficient manner possible… Most of the time we must assume they can achieve this objective. Only complaining when things truly break down in this regard. So, normally, perhaps for considerable periods of time, they do manage to oversee and control an adequate degree of circulation for the traffic given an adequate system in the first place? (22)
Obviously, we must assume these professional are actually doing something and, hopefully, something judged to be worthwhile given that many seem to be well paid in the technical pursuit of their professional disciplines? (23)
So, we have a number of problems. However, before even suggesting the possibility of consilience let us try to square the circle and come to some accommodation as to how a discipline could function at all if the point of points made by its basic premise defy absolute evidential presentation and verificational confirmation and merely operate, wittingly or unwittingly, through endless circles and cycles of deferment? (24)
In the discipline/s2 of philosophy we might argue that its basic premise is that we can search for or expose truth or wisdom or similar to some degree or other, and, that such investigations are salutary in some form or other (even by default if found inconsistent, cul de sac’s, subjected to endless circles and cycles of deferment). That being the case, more or less, given the postmodernist attack on the concept of (absolute) truth we must ask what have we left if we accept such a critique? In the same vein, why do philosophers still find work in our universities, e.g? Although, it is also true to say that the discipline of philosophy is under various forms of encroachment from cultural studies, mere historical presentation, and more novel forms of discipline that merely look at texts, power structures, status, ideas, etc. That, in effect, the same or similar problems and questions, and spectrum of potential resolutions, apply to each and every discipline…? (25)
3. Trans-Disciplinary Accommodation?
Before attempting some form of a trans-disciplinary accommodation between disciplines (in general, particular types or specifically) let me examine the possibilities of establishing an intra-disciplinary form of accommodation between absolute and relative expressions of aspiration and ambition within a discipline in general. (26)
If a philosopher is concerned about truth value then there are various basic genres for dealing with the same. E.g., defining and differentiating various types of truth, e.g., synthetic, a priori, synthetic a priori. Or, in defining various types of value, e.g., de-ontological, pragmagtical, historical, etc. W.r.t. forms of division some people like to re-accommodate across divisions and/or insist on even finer distinctions, etc. E.g., making a claim that synthetic a priori truth exists (or how synthetic and analytic truth values can entail each other; e.g., to say a lion is a big cat is more meaningful when we can visualize the same even though it could be treated merely analytically along the lines ‘that of all the various species of cat, lions are one member of the same and are normally larger in comparison with most other species of cat, etc.). Or, arguing that there are different kinds of synthetic truth like, e.g., historical, the existential truth of mythological value, the consistency of a novel’s narrative, etc., etc. (27)
Now, if a philosopher take their basic premise literally they would need to explicate what is meant by truth, value and the like. However, if on an absolute level of aspiration such a search is undergone then those investigation, like any other investigations in any other discipline, will meet the rockface of defining and engaging such an ultimate conclusion along with its ultimacy in positioning(/repositioning/re-positioning). But, without the contrast of a closely connected comparison within the same field of differentiation there can be no sense, no meaning and no meaningfulness, i.e., no form of value to engage with (i.e., ontologically encounter and epistemologically recognize). Obviously a value without value has no value, can have no phenomenal-phenomenological sense (in our textual mapping of the world), no (meta-textual) hermeneutic meaning and no existential (non-textual) semblance of meaningfulness. So much for absolute aspirations. On such a journey, in an attempt to explore the very boundaries between significance and a complete lack of significance much can be learnt along the way (such as developing tools for the clarification of our thinking, etc., as well as coming to the realization that the ultimate cannot be approached in such a manner, if at all?). However, a clarification of this special type of skepticism leads us on to another problem, or, perhaps, more a set of closely linked problems. If certain influential members, skilful in their discipline, were to realize this fact that there is an almighty flaw at the very center of their discourse, and all other discourses, then we must ask how competent are they in the continued pursuit of evidence, etc., in their profession thereafter, or, if now aware of this impenetrable rockface as an absolute obstacle in the course of their investigative aspirations then how professional could they be if such a fundamental defect has been so unprofessionally overlooked? As it appears that such disconformity within and between theory and practice (and critique) can be so seriously overlooked then we must further ask how such ensuing eternal deferment is met with such silence, such looks of amazement, or worse, with a form of reproach that the questioner is only a mere amateur or a poor professional who is either lazy in their investigations or has completely lost the plot. As a consequence, the potential of such a devastating critique is soon drowned out in more bouts of noisy deferment as professionals continue to noisily contest their choice of cabins upon a slowly sinking ship… so the additional question must be asked how can the exponents of a discipline, any discipline, operate as if the searching for ultimate aspirations were a normal, legitimate pursuit? And giving its submergence behind the façade of business as usual how can this untenable type of position be allowed to persist… and not be resolved through its mere abandonment? (28)
We have some metaphorical clues here. Professionals, etc., from the ‘noise’ of continual deferment, in professional ‘business as usual’, either wont or cannot ask such questions, or, in being asked, of them or by them, they just cannot be heard by others and, thereafter, addressed either individually or collectively. Especially if there is no desire, should be no desire… to entertain such professional ‘blasphemy’. On the contrary, will absolutely insist that the basic premise holds without a doubt, that both evidence and verification has, and can be found, a sense of conclusiveness that can be re-iterated given the best of intent, patience, acceptance and an endeepened desire for the perfection of such aspirations… perhaps best sought in the quiet and lonely confines of one’s own time and space with due diligence…. (29)
So, things are noisy, you will not be heard seriously proposing such questions, a mental set is not in place that would allow the normal ‘investigator’ to realized this awful conclusion (that there is no real conclusion and no real beginning either, and, only continual deferment), that such ‘blasphemy’ just cannot be tolerated, or, if it were to be seriously contemplated an innate fear would set in from an intuitive anxiety over a loss of vocation, a loss of profession, a losing of faith in how they see themselves and how others would see them, etc…! (30)
A ‘good’ professional pulls their head in, so to speak, and, never bites the hand that feeds them, still, there will always be a few souls trying to deconstruct what needs to fall down… what deserves deconstruction… if not demolition…! (31)
A normal professional, apparently, is as much beholden to this misguided search for absolute aspirations as their professional cliental. It is in this desire, transformed into misplaced faith, that we need to ask why is the basic premise so stubbornly alluded to, overlooked in so-called conclusive research and never absolutely critiqued, i.e., subjected to full, critical appreciation! Essentially, it would appear, another circle and/or cycle of deferment overlays this more basic circle and/or cycle of deferment between the basic premise, so-called forms of evidence and so-called forms of verification. This smokescreen operates more along the following lines: because of some defect in your basic existence or character you must fall by having such a weight upon your metaphorical shoulders, however, there is glimmer of hope and by doing as you are told you will find the requisite salvation. Unfortunately, at the end of your day you go to sleep, and, the next day, you awake to find the same old emotional traps spinning and spun out before you; enticing you to try again, try a little harder, imploring you to not give in to non-professional forms of distraction and not to ‘give up’… having come so far that you should have seen and experienced that glimmer of light at the end of this impossible tunnel…. (32)
Addictive stuff! Amid the clamour of such continual recycling very few souls can look down through the whirling turbulence and see through such endless noise to the overwhelming abyss that awaits beneath. In a vicious circle of such promoted desire and ensuing proliferation progress can only be made in relative terms of reference, i.e. on the level or levels of ambition… in the technical pursuit of this discipline… either as a professional or as an amateur or as a client or potential client…. (33)
Understood in this manner we now see the basic premise as being that inserted into its own basic system of understanding where the person is defined as base or basically defective in some specific, pseudo-existential-like sense and, that this cognitive rift, between ideality and current reality, can be overcome by following the basic path set out for such transformational transcendence. And, now, we have two circles, and ensuing cycles, of deferment catering, more or less, respectively for aspirations and ambitions. That in effect, the vicious cycling of ‘basic premise – basic defect – basic path’ overlays this more primary vicious cycling of ‘basic premise – evidence – verification’. (34)
There appears a parallel between these two vicious forms of recycling, namely, a theoretical position of the basic premise followed by the critique of either the basic path or (‘critical’) verification(al appreciation), and, the practice of either searching for evidence and presenting the same or following the instructions pertaining to the so-called basic path…. (35)
Deeply entrenched such recycling poses an apparent existential dilemma and then appears to solve it for us whilst at the same time merely perpetuating this endless cycle of merely allayed anxieties… finding partial success in only a partial, impermanent deferment of deep-seated anxieties, in effect, forming a third level of recycled deferment! Thence a deferment of evidence and verification is overlaid by a deferment of adverse cognitive re-positioning to be further overlaid by a partial, inadequate deferment of pseudo-existential anxieties… Above such endless churning how are we to find a still-point where we can recover a profound relational expression of authenticity amid such drowning be it professional, amateur or as a client of such attractive disciplinary systems. Into such a misplaced mix of ideation should we persevere with more discipline or less? Can the very means of our apparent failure rescue us? Can disciplines be reconstructed and find legitimate forms of professional service? (36)
If we were to accept this simplified outline of our deconstructive investigations then as all disciplines can be tarred with the same sort of brush, as aspirational failures and over ambitious programs, is it not possible to see some form of consilience in such insight. Furthermore, if we were to arrive at an understanding that can find an authenticity of value as central in such rectified discourses would it not be the case that this generalized approach could offer a re-normalized vision of such disciplines and re-find for them a place in society where they can now offer an authenticity of value as long as they are not allowed to stray beyond the limitations and boundaries to be associated with their critical deployment? (37)
Although a partial allaying of anxiety may inauthentically entrench a discipline, on the other hand. it would be too simplistic to say that their true primary role was to merely create anxiety and then attempt to allay the same? Watching a bunch of philosophers, e.g., might well be an anxiety provoking situation as they keep on saying things that either disturb us or appear as so trite as to not be worth dwelling on. Or, worse, in listening further, we inevitably will be helplessly fed through some horrendous dilemma that appears to be either irresolvable or something that forces us to take one side or the other in such disputes. Various predilections towards either ‘an idealistic vision of the total world’ or ‘a more realistic focusing on what merely appears to hand’, predicably driving us this way or that way and along the way overlooking what is even more uncomfortable for us to face… in our attempting to find some form of authentic significance before the fact of our sharing in the unpredictable suffering of the world…and our own inevitable ‘untimely’ death…. (38)
Can this project of reclamation be carried out? In the world as lived just how does and should a discipline function? Let me outline my vision as to how a discipline can be rectified and re-normalized given that the existential value of a valued discipline must have that degree of value that allows it to persist in a culture through time whilst maintaining some form of integrity in the ongoing formation/reformation/re-formation of its relational uniqueness in identity? (39)
Is this appeal to ‘integrity’ the basis for a valid argument (or a mere play on the word ‘integrity’)? (40)
However, in a short digression let me add a number of points first before we address the relative successfulness of disciplines. For a start, let us say that any one discipline could act as a commentary on any other although to qualify this we might add that disciplines relative close to each other (in terms of sense, i.e., our semantic mapping of the same in our cultural-intercultural universe) would more than likely supply or provoke a more interesting commentary. E.g., it is often the case that a new field in mathematics finds a usefulness in a field of physics whose representation/re-presentation is better described and/or manipulated by this new mathematical tool or field of study. Or, e.g., we could have a ‘philosophy of history’ profitably placed in a comparison with a ‘history of philosophy’. Or, e.g., we could look at a philosophy of science(-history) and compare what scientists say they do with a study that looks at what they actually seem to do from a sociological point of view, etc. (41)
A second point is this: that circles of deferment could be treated as adverse, as vicious to the extent that their output is not much more productive than their input. On the other hand, we could refer to a cycle of deferment as never quite returning to where it began and hence was to be treated as being more productive in insightful value-formation, etc. This distinction preparing the ground for an investigation that exams the relative successfulness of disciplines (because of the ongoing productivity of cycles of deferment and the relatively novel territory that may well be traversed in and through the same). (42)
As a third point: I would like to note the role of the critically enacted overall transcendental suspension for disabling and completely deconstructing absolute aspirations and replacing the same with relative ambitions (and relative aspirations being activated when and where a discipline stands in need of some fruitful form of reconstruction, rectification, re-application, re-direction, etc.). (43)
As a last point let me re-note the three cycles of deferment discussed in this essay-paper, namely, on an absolute(-like) level of aspiration, on a cognitive appreciation of the absolute failure of absolute aspirations, and, the apparent emotional fallout arising from the former and modes of affective compensation that try to gloss or gloss over such psychic rifts between idealistic expectations and the realistic realizations of such unmet aspirations. (44)
Given this absolute failure of absolute aspiration (e.g., ‘there is a God – how might I encounter and know such a Being?’ being entertained as an absolute premise or proposition where it is not possible to find either or both absolute evidence and absolute verification for the same) we may well question the point of even considering the basic premise that I would strongly argue is central to each and every distinctive and unique form of discipline. Each discipline being seen as disciplinary field (through the distinctive work done in its own unique field of circulation, etc.)? Just what would be the point of noting this basic premise and constructing one that would appear to be central to doing that type of disciplined work that appertains to that field of concern under such current investigation? If nothing else, the basic premise declares the central type of intentional object, object-state, or, intentional objective being focused on in that disciplinary field and lending itself to its characterization by means of the same. E.g., in mathematics we are dealing with numbers and their identities and interrelations. We are not dealing with the counting of money or the counting of stars in a particular galaxy but much more with the field of mathematics itself. Should we have the need to apply the same, in our world as lived, then let us note the natural limits of our discipline, and, note at the same time basic metaphors associated with such project(ed commission)s, etc. (45)
Does a discipline, in a normal sense, as observed in the world as lived, possess a certain degree of integrity despite the absolute failure of aspirations and associated forms of investigation attempting to obtain absolute evidence and absolute verification of the same? We must answer with a “yes” given the exponential increase in productivity associated with disciplines in general. Even failed metaphors can be resurrected if suitably qualified/re-qualified, etc. Let me examine and demonstrate this relative successfulness of relative discourses, in general, within their associated disciplines. (46)
In this we need to ask what work a discipline does in general3 (or in particular, say w.r.t. a particular science, in specifically w.r.t. a unique discipline say ‘selling objects at a collectors’ fair’ or ‘being a doctor’ or ‘training to be Olympic athlete’, etc.)? (47)
In this regard, and in order to view a spirit of integrity, authenticity, etc., we may need to resurrect these previous concepts of a basic premise, evidence, verification, etc. As noted, the overall suspension of the basic premise gives us the distinctive nature of the topic being dealt with by that discipline in question. Hence the area of focus exercised by a discipline needs to be integrated about such a topic and exhibit some degree of non-absolute integrity in that regard (since different areas of the psyche not integrated by a specific discipline theoretically would call for the same number of distinct, parallel disciplines). So, e.g., a mathematical discipline (or sub-discipline within the field of mathematics) must deal with ‘some form of numerical identity and the possible mathematical interrelationships that devolve from the same’. Into such a context how should we understand what might be evidential and verificational, etc? (48)
Let me look at a number of disciplines in order to observe what might be considered to be evidential or verificational in general, etc., and if these two concepts can be considered to have a real role to play in the exercise of each and every discipline? (49)
E.g., what might count as evidence in a mathematical domain? That all two dimensional triangles have three sides is an analytical fact. However, into what distinctive categories of general shape all triangles fall into is something to be discovered by looking at specific instances of triangularity. There we would discover right-angled triangles, isosceles triangles, and scalene triangles. We could then define the same in negative and positive terms like ‘possesses one angle that is a right-angle’, or ‘does not possess two identical angles’, etc. In a form of mathematical-eidetic-like reflection all types of triangles could be generated by taking one angle and altering it one degree at a time, or part of a degree at a time, etc., and noting the possibilities that stem from the same. With a right-angle triangle we can note that it has been accepted and verified that ‘the sides of that triangle have three different lengths’ but are related ‘by the square of the hypotenuse being equal to the sum of the other two sides squared’. That such a proof can be demonstrated in order to verify the same. Or, e.g., in the profession of a flight controller we could say that the relatively smooth arrival and departure of planes, without mishap, is a sign that everything is going to plan more or less. I am sure, today, the collective examination of such events would be given some satisfaction score or put on some index of efficiency or similar. Or, e.g., a scientific discipline should deal with evidence and supply non-analytical means for the verification of the same along with the hermeneutical means to appreciate just what is being done in such an interrelationship, and v.v. However, just how far does this conceptual relationship between so-called ‘evidence’ and so-called ‘verification’ travel, in non-absolute, relative terms of reference when transferred to other disciplines, if not all disciplines? A simple solution to this problem might be to merely say that ‘the presentation of the objects denominated by the basic premise amounts to evidence’, and, ‘verification’ is merely the establishing of the relations claimed w.r.t. evidence vis-à-vis that evidence per se or ourselves as potential observers, recipients, etc., of the same’. So, e.g., an astronomer might say we have various modes of evidence that strongly suggest there is blackhole at the center of our galaxy, the examination of that evidence would then be subjected to scrutiny within that discipline itself in order to ascertain to what extent its own hermeneutic rulings have been complied with, that evidence has been validly obtained, and, that current conclusions that such related relations as noted do appear to hold. Or, e.g., an astrologer, well regarded by serious members of that discipline, might argue that on statistical grounds a certain person’s chart would suggest a career in x field or be a religious person of a certain type and have such and such interests, dispositions, predilections, traits, etc. Evidence, and verification, here would be of three kinds, namely, in accordance with the standard reading of a chart plus various degrees of intuitive re-assessment (through the re/adoption and re/adaptation of genre/s), forms of self-assessment or other assessment of the vocation, religious dimension if possessed, personality profile, etc., and, to what extent there is or is not a correlation between the former. I.e., that the chart is correctly interpreted, that the personal profile is independently assessed in the light of the categories of the chart (for the sake of comparison), and, importantly, whether there is a considerable correlation or not between the former. Whether we believe in astrology or not this would be in conformity with its basic premise that would claim to this effect, ‘that macrocosmic star patterns portend a greater probability of certain microcosmic instantiations’, or words to that effect?4 A topic that needs to be assessed scientifically and not merely ignored, or affirmed, on a priori grounds. (50)
Earlier, I noted, as examples, twelve disciplines.5 Can this rule of thumb re evidence, etc., be applied to these fields too not already examined? That list noted: science, astrology, medicine, theology, sociology, psychology, mathematics, history, transcendental phenomenology, etc. Working our way through this list we accept that science is or should be evidence-based. Astrology has been dealt with. Medicine, again, should be evidence based when often it only pretends to be. So, one month we are told we should not eat too much salt, sugar and butter, and, the next, we are told salt intake makes little difference to blood pressure, artificial sweeteners don’t help you to diet and can increase your incidence of various cancers along with those that seem arise with the use of seed-based oils (that need processes of hydrogenation, etc.). Whether such claims are right or wrong it is obvious that intensive longitudinal studies still need to be conducted and appropriately analysed. As for the discipline of theology we would need some time to properly argue that even in this type of field of endeavour certain forms of evidence could be argued for, rightly or wrongly, and that to claim this discipline is merely out to prove the existence of God or the Divine in some form or other is to miss the role or work done or attempted in this field. This discipline attempts to target certain aspects of the psyche, focusing on certain types of spiritual matters, attitudes, behaviours, etc., that may well function and supply forms of existentially oriented value without regard to an actual Deity or some other embodied form/s of the Divine, etc. Sociology and psychology can be seen inter-linked to the extent interpersonal behaviour could be read as the primary preoccupation of the former and personal behaviour could be read as the primary preoccupation of the latter. Evidence could be obtained, theoretically, through self-reporting, other-reporting, studied through relevant physiological indicators, etc. Mathematical evidence, etc., has been dealt with. History can be seen as the gathering of relevant facts, their careful interpretation and critique (and we can look for evidence, etc., on all three of those levels). Transcendental phenomenology looks at the intentional presentation of evidence as exercised in and through the adequate and apposite use of an overall transcendental suspension, etc. Freudian psychology, may now be seen to offer very little in the way of a cost-efficient and effective form of treatment, but, still, there are some people who like to be analyzed and are willing to pay for the same. On the other hand, we can take a charitable vision of a system and see all systems as supplying more value than that given on input, although, rightly, a critical comparative assessment would establish to what degree this value formation is to be valued or deserve to not be so valued? In the discipline of gastronomy, we eat the evidence and then come to some form of a consensus as to whether a certain meal or some part of a meal was or was not of an outstanding quality, etc. In tax law, we might argue that the amount of revenue the state raises as a fraction of total gross national product to be the relative success or otherwise of that system of tax; along with other considerations of consistency, ability to be clearly read and acted upon, is not a barrier to much greater degrees of investment, etc. That to some extent, in a wide variety of modes of adoptions and adaptations, this concept of disciplinary evidence and verification can be applied across the field to many disciplines if not to all, albeit with whatever adjustments are necessary in that regard? Hence this claim: that in a discipline ‘evidence’ is the presentation of objectives nominated/denominated6 by the basic premise of that discipline (can be accessed by a overall transcendental suspension in a form exemplified by their phenomenal-phenomenological form and format of presentation) and that ‘verification’ is conducted in terms of the relationships denominated/nominated by the interactive relationships between such items of evidence and our interactions with the same; that a notified conformity between evidence and verification is spelt out by that discipline and should be duly met in practice; a critique re-investigating such claims of conformity between the basic premise, modes of presentations, evidence, verification, comparative examinations of value-formation, noting of implications and consequences (i.e., ramifications), etc., etc. All in all, giving each discipline a number of tasks constructed along similar lines but which may not at first glance bear much resemblance with the exercise of other disciplines. (51)
Despite an absolute failure we could argue that a metaphorical approach to the same may well be productive of value (given that metaphors cannot be read in a literal sense whilst remaining metaphorical). However, the value of a discipline would appear to arise primarily in its relative exercise. Given this imputed structural isomorphism between disciplines (in regards to a basic premise [and allied topics], the presentation of ‘evidence’ and the utilization of ‘verification’ to confirm the evidential status of the former) let us now examine how the value formation associated with disciplines in a relative, non-absolute mode might arise in general terms of reference. Thence the relative work and ensuing relative power of a discipline. (52)
Between this basic premise, whether treated implicitly or explicitly, and the presentation of evidence and its verification we have, in effect, a hermeneutic circle. In the light of previous analyses of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension we can assign the presentation of evidence to the textual-analytical mode associated with phenomenal-phenomenological treatment, the basic premise and its allied associations would naturally form a meta-textual background and supply hermeneutically oriented genres of behaviour, and, the conformity or isomorphism realized between evidence and the presuppositional, meta-textual ground of the basic premise along with its allied associations, etc., the sense and semblance of verification would arise from such a perceived fit or matching between the same. A parallel can also be made with the overall transcendental suspension with the reductive matching the textual presentation of evidence, the synthetic meta-textual orientation matching the basic premise and its allied topics, and, verification being experienced as a matching between the former and its realization of an existential sense of the non-textual; the total circulation of the same realizing a not-textual sense of the existential in a more systematic sense. Thence the realization of ensuing value from such an economy even though the spontaneity of value formation is not primarily ‘economic’ in its issuance whilst at the same being inescapably bound to such a matrix. Thence the emergence of value rather than its straightforward manufacture. Hence, in and through such formation, the formation of the relative value of a discipline. Such arising, in terms of its overall richness, allowing forms of comparison between seemingly incommensurable fields by virtue of this semblance of an overall richness in value formation arising from the density of modes actively engaged, the intensity of such expression, and, the existential surplus of value realized in and through such formation (as indicated through the propensity of iterative structures being re-iterative in its patterns of bare performance of common motifs, etc.). Hence the hermeneutic circle of relative disciplinary performance is equivalent to the hermeneutic circle of comprehension and the overall transcendental suspension. By reference to such basic equivalence we can run comparative evaluations of the overall richness in value formation associated with the exercise of particular disciplines despite the relative incommensurability of one discipline with respect to some other. Obviously, in a suspension of the disciplines in question, we would still say that the disciplinary fields of medicine and science, e.g., are incomparably more productive of value and ensuing power than, say, e.g., than the value resident in religious faith healing or Scientology... In a forest not all trees are equal…. (53)
As a general rule, what establishes the productivity of a discipline is its ability to run a paradigm that is able to present an abundance of evidential material able to meet forms of verification as defined by the hermeneutic considerations of that paradigm. To some extent we could say that each paradigm (centered in this implicit/explicit basic premise, etc.) carves out its own unique territory in the psyche, and, that competing paradigms, e.g., different religious points of view (be that denomination or extra-traditional) would need to compete in order to establish the current dominancy of one party over another and all others. Hence a concern with major and minor discourses, etc. However, it should also be noted that in a mature democracy, as discussed elsewhere, minor discourses are both enfranchised (internally) and empowered (externally) despite their status as a minor discourses. That, collectively, minor discourses, can compete with major discourses and create a collective major discourse as if by default? (54)
In a careful comparison between different, non-competing discourses, say a Western medical model and say a major Eastern religious discipline, would we be comparing chalk with cheese and assume a certain degree of incommensurability, or, critically estimate to what extent the absence of such a discipline might make on the psychic landscape if it were to be imaginatively removed? Or, just assume that the extensive pervasion and presence of both traditions in a certain culture where both are found to reign supreme implies the psychic importance of both to that culture in question and put aside any need for a quantitative approach to this topic of comparative evaluation? (55)
Assuming different paradigms can co-exist when the apparent centers of such disciplines do not directly coincide in terms of sense (i.e., psychic location in the mapping of a culture and its cultural understanding of the world as lived) then we must understand the contribution each discipline then brings to the overall formation of value realized for that individual or community or culture in question, etc. (56)
Is there a difference in the formation of value between an absolute cycle of deferment and a relative cycle of deferment? In the former we noted three levels of deferment on a basic level, in cognitive terms of a somewhat embarrassed intellectual discomfit, and, then, in a more emotional, overall experience of an affective discomfort. In a relative orientation to what extent does some form of deferment contribute to the circulation of value and its emergence as an existential surplus of value through such cycling or re-cycling? In the orthodox, Western model of medical practice, e.g., would we find forms of both absolute deferment and relative deferment? Often, we find a conspiracy of silence between the doctor and the patient (and sometimes in reverse when a patient, e.g., is embarrassed to admit to or merely omits certain information that might be essential and relevant, if not crucial, to the decision making process to be entered into by the former). If the doctor has a number of possibilities to currently entertain they may be reluctant to mention any of them for a variety of reasons. Then, therapy might be entered into in merely a prophylactic mode or merely to address the symptoms and not the root cause of the current condition. The doctor, e.g., might say to their patient that they were going to treat the brain tumour with radiation therapy without saying that this was being done not in any hope of curing the condition but merely to shrink the cancer somewhat and improve the quality of what remaining time their patient had before death. By being vague the patient finds a false hope and the doctor does not have to break the inevitable news that the condition is terminable and treatment is only for palliative reasons. Given this example, and the presentation of others, we would conclude that both absolute and relative forms of disciplinary exercise have their own cycles of deferment. On the other hand, the relative exercise of a discipline appears to generally supply more value than its absolute deployment. That the value that does arises is emergent (and non-reductive in nature). E.g., the treatment a doctor provides say in the form of medicines is not going to work, if it could work, by merely keeping the pills in their jar (unlike some forms of sympathetic magic). Similarly, the use of antibiotics is not going to work if the ongoing course of such medicine is not strictly followed. Therefore, practice needs to be viewed through the corresponding discipline and followed accordingly. Hence the general role for a discipline to supervise such practice. (57)
We are now in a position to understand both the intra-disciplinary form of accommodation and a trans-disciplinary form of accommodation. In the former we have the hermeneutic circle of relative disciplinary performance and its apparent consistency of performance. In the latter we need operative forms of consilience in order to establish viable forms of value formation through the interaction of the same. I.e., on the grounds of isomorphism of the hermeneutic circles (or, rather, cycles) of relative value formation let us assume that absolute forms of productive deployment are conducted through the relative usefulness of key metaphor and/or key rhetorical devices, etc., along with various forms of positively perceived emotive re-evaluations through the positive aspects of cognitively and affectively charged modes of deferment. On the other hand, in relative deployments of relative economies in value formation we can note that an emergence in value formation should be directly evidenced to that extent and in that manner this process of existential enhancement should arise and find forms of adequate verification therein and thereafter. (58)
Having established an imputed isomorphism between disciplines (in terms of absolute/relative aspirations and relative ambitions, etc.) we can now continue to investigate to what extent viable comparisons between or within disciplines, sub-disciplines and/or super-disciplines can be conducted. Obviously, some disciplines form close connections with other disciplines whereas other disciplines may elect to remain relatively isolated. As a rule of thumb we might like to note that relatively non-isolated disciplines as having a higher degree of fitness; be that in psychological, economic and/or evolutionary terms of reference, etc. Hence the possibility of a trans-disciplinary accommodation. In our study of this phenomenon (of practice, etc.) let me note types of consilience, and the interrelated complexity and simplicity of such topic (in its general, particular and specific application/s). (59)
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