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1. The Australian Naval Institute has been formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory.
The main objects of the Institute are-

a. to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the
Maritime profession.

b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and
the Maritime profession.

c. to publish a journal.

  1. The Institute is self supporting and non-profit making. The aim is to encourage freedom of dis cussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

  2. Membership of the Institute is open to:-

a. Regular Members-Members of the Permanent Naval Forces of Australia.

b. Associate Members(1) Members of the Reserve Naval Forces of Australia.

  1. Members of the Australian Military Forces and the Royal Australian Air Force both permanent and reserve.

  2. Ex-members of the Australian Defence Forces, both permanent and reserve components, provided that they have been honourably discharged from that force.

(4) Other persons having and professing a special interest in naval
and maritime affairs.

c. Honorary Members-A person who has made a distinguished contribution to the Naval or

maritime profession or who has rendered distinguished service to the Institute may be elected by the Council to Honorary Membership.

  1. Joining fee for Regular and Associate Member is $5. Annual Subscription for both is $10.

  2. Inquiries and application for membership should be directed to:

The Secretary,
Australian Naval Institute,
P.O. Box 18,
DEAKIN, A.C.T. 2600.


As the Australian Naval Institute exists for the promotion and advancement of knowledge relating to the Naval and maritime profession, all members are strongly encouraged to submit articles for publication. Only in this way will our aims be achieved.


In writing for the Institute it must be borne in mind that the views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily tuose of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute.



President's Annua] Report 2

Chapter News 2

Correspondence 3

Financial Statements 5

Officer Development - By Rear Admiral G. R. Griffiths, DSO, DSC, RAN 6

Training the General List Officer, Some Problems and

Possibilities - By 'Master Ned' 10

Pearl Harbour By LCDR. W. M. Swan, RAN (Ret) 16

From the Editor . 17

Objectivity in Ship Procurement - By LCDR. C. J. Skinner, RAN 18

Proposed Protected Cruiser for Australia 23

Wargaming By Lieutenant S. P. Lemon RAN 27

Book Reviews 35

Articles or condensations of articles are not to be reprinted or reproduced without the permission of the Institute, Extracts may be quoted for the purposes of research, review or comment provided the source is acknowledged

OUR COVER Our cover now features the crest of the Australian Naval Institute.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute-Page I

President's Report Presented at the

Annual General Meeting

Held on 22 October. 1976

It gives me much pleasure in reporting to you the activities of the Australian Naval Institute for the year 1975/76. Since my first report there has been considerable progress. On the 30 September 1976 our membership stood at 140 regular, 115 associate and 3 honorary members, a total increase of 125 since 30 September 1975. This is very gratifying but we should all strive to encourage more to join. The future success of the Australian Naval Institute depends largely on the strength of its membership.

The Council has met each month during the year under review to conduct the day to day business of the Institute. I would like to take this opportunity to thank all officers and councillors for their support and advice during the year. As foreshadowed in my Report last year the By-Laws have now been issued.

The issue of the August 3976 Journal (our 5th) displayed the Institute's new crest on the cover. It is intended that the crest be used for future issues until we are big enough and weatlhy enough to vary the cover illustration from issue to issue. The Journal, thanks to the dedication of a small group of enthusiasts, has reached a high standard in articles printed and is being widely praised for its content. I would like to add here that contributions from members in the way of letters and comment on articles published has not been very large and if we are to attain our aim, we need more from members to the forum, about which, for years many, many Naval people lamented the fact that we did not possess-we now do—so to your pens.

Support for a National Headquarters from the organisations mentioned last year was minimal. This project is kept under constant review by the Council but prospects do not look very promising.

Chapters of the Institute are active both in Sydney and Canberra under the vigoruous leader­ship of their respective Convenors. Regular meet­ings are held and papers perscntcd which are later published in the Journal. It is hoped that like-minded enthusiasts in other centres will follow suit. It does not require many tnembers to start a Chapter.

The state of our finances and the record of income and expenditure up to the end of our financial year (30 September) have been distributed separately and will be printed in the next issue of the Journal. As can be seen our funds are in a comparatively healthy state but as with everything, inflation continues to exercise its grip on our rising publsihing costs.

To summarise, a year of consolidation and steady progress.



On Wednesday. 29th September, Rear Admiral G. R. GRIFFITHS, DSO, DSC, the Chief of Naval Personnel, addressed the Canberra Chapter on the subject of "Officer Development"

The meeting, which was held at the usual venue. KM National Headquarters, and chaired by the Convenor, Captain L. G. FOX, RAN, produced our best ever attend­ance of 41 members and guests

The Admiral's talk stimulated a large number of questions and a wide ranging discussion which extended into the refreshment period, after closure of the formal meeting.

The next meeting will be held on Tuesday, 30th November when Commander A. R. CUMMINS, RAN is expected to address the Chapter on the subject "Opera­tional Training Projections for the 1980V.

Canberra Chapter Annual Report

The Canberra Chapter has met on Five occasions al RSL National Headquarters during the 1975/76 year with an aggregate attendance of 133 members. Papers were delivered at these meetings as follows:

October 1975: The Future Role of Womens Services by Captain B.D. McLeod A.M. WRANS

November 1975: The Indian Armed Services-An Over­view by Captain T.R. Fisher, RAN

March 1976: Australian Martitime Trade

by Captain N. Ralph DSC, RAN

June 1976: The FFG Acquisition-Some Aspects

of the Management Role by Captain N.R.B. Berlyn RAN

September 1976: Officer Development

by Rear Admiral G.R. Griffiths DSO, DSC

Chapter Finances solely involved the sale of refresh­ments in which the cash turnover totalled 1144.93. The Chapter has an outstanding liability of SI3.00 with cash in hand of S20.22. It also has assets to the value of $30.45. The Chapter accounts have been audited by the Honorary Treasurer of the ANI.

The Office Bearers of the Canberra Chapter are as follows: Convener-Captain L. G. Fox; Secretary - Lieu­tenant R. Jemesen; Treasurer -Mr. F. Goddard

The next meeting of the Canberra Chapter will take place at the RSL National Headquarters Tuesday. 30th November, 1976, and further meetings are expected to occur thereafter during 1977 at approximately quarterly intervals.

Page 2 -Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

In conclusion, it is considered that the proceedings of the Canberra Chapter have made a valuable contribu­tion to the growth of the ANI and it is with some optimism that the office bearers look forward to the Chapter year 1976/77.

L. C. Fox Captain, RAN Chapter Convener

Sydney Chapter Annual Report

The inaugural meeting was held on 22 October, 1975 at which the film "The Rise of the Red Navy" and two papers were presented. "The Battleship Mentality Part 1 - The Case for the Prosecution" was presented by Captain J, A. Robertson and 'Software at Sea' was presented by Lieutenant Commander C. J, Skinner. Both papers and the film invoked considerable interest and subsequent discussion.

The second meeting was held on 10th December, 1975 when two papers were presented, "Naval Aspects of the Defence of Australia' by Rear Admiral N. E. McDonald and "Operation Sea King Recovery" by Captain J A. Robertson.

The first meeting for 1976 was held on 21st January at which the President, Commodore V. A. Parker, attended and addressed the members. Two papers were presented, "The Aircraft Carrier" by Commander G. Nekrasov and "The Battleship Mentality Part 2-The Case for the Defence" by Captain J. A. Robertson.

At the meeting on 10th March 1976 Captain J. A. Robertson introduced the major topic of Naval Wargaming by giving a brief review of its history. Mr. Dennis Brackman. a wargamet of international experience, then spoke on recreational wargames available, how they are devised, constructed and played. He used the game "The Soloman Islands Campaign" to demonstrate a typical game.

On the tlth April 1976 a film night was held at the TAS School, HMAS Watson where the film "Tora. Tora, Tora' was shown. This was preceded by a short address on the Intelligence aspects ot the lilm by Lieuten­ant Commander W N. Swan RAN (ret'd.).

The last formal event was a presentation on the Battle of the Coral Sea at HMAS Penguin on 7th May. 1976.

Frcmantle Chapter Annual Report

The l-romantlc Chapter of the ANI operates on an informal and infrequent basts. There arc only about eight financial members, but meetings are open to all and so far wc have had fair attendance.

The first meeting was on the 26th March 1976 when seven people heard a presentation for Lieutenants Dave Taylor and Norm Good on 'Aspects of Naval History". including a brief discourse on the origins of some ships' crests.

The second meeting on the 29th July 1976 was a film caUed 'The Rise of the Red Navy' followed by informal discussion. This meeting was attended by 15 people. Our last meeting on 23 September 1976 was also a film, The War Game (about the effects of a nuclear explosion in S. England) followed by a discussion with Mr Col Porter from the Department of Conservation and the Environment Mr. Porter was most interesting not only because of his current background, but also because he knew the director of the film at the time of its product-Ion.

The original convenor was LCDR. Geoff Cutts but due to a recent posting this task is now being undertaken by Lieui. Dave Taylor.


Dear Sir.

1 was delighted to see "Juror's" letter in the May '76 Journal, and I concede his point that I have not pro­perly investigated the Battleship Mentality in the RAN. Unfortunately he weakens his position by the statement about the "DDG acquisitions during the gun-boat war of Confrontation". In fact the DDG's were ordered four years before Confrontation began. Nevertheless, I hope his letter will have roused some others to write and tackle the subject with greater precision.

While commenting on the May issue, "Slingshot" is obviously another member with something thicker than ice water in his veins. While I do not agree completely with everything he says, either, it is, in my opinion, one of the best contributions we have had so far, and gives me great hope for the Institute's future. Whoever you arc "Slingshot", keep it up.

Of course this could be said of all our contributors, and it may seem pointed to omit anyone. This is certainly not my intention if I single out Captain Neil Ralph's article on our maritime trade (May 76 also). On such matters may hang all the law and the prophets of Maritime Defence of this country. So many supposedly cheap solutions proposed for Australia's Maritime Defence seem to overlook the fact that we will probably be back to having to import all our oil fuel within five years. Unless we can find more oil here, or develop substitutes, it seems that the first requirement for our defence forces could be to ensure that we can bring in enough oil to run the country, first of all, and still have enough left over for the fighting vehicles.

Before I close, I think the time has come to mention that, while I acknowledge the hard work and devotion of our editorial team, and sympathise with their pleas for copy, we wfll have to avoid the mistakes, omissions and misspellings wnich have so far marred their otherwise praiseworthy efforts. For instance, the book review of the "Ultra Secret" should have said that, because of ex­cellent Intelligence, the principal Headquarters fighting the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II knew practically evervthing the U-boatt in the Atlantic were up to. The omission of the words in italics made nonsense of the whole paragraph. Similarly, simple spelling mistakes and misprints detract from the attitude of professionalism we are supposed to be trying to promote. If the editorial staff cannot find the time needed (and that is easy to under­stand) would you think of sending the galley proofs back to authors for proof reading? It would cost a bit more in postage and time, but it would be worth it.



With regard to Captain Robertson's comments on editing we are well aware of our shortcomings and during the production of each edition wc try to do better. Unfortunately a pet gremlin still seems to be in the system. Now that we appear to have a stabilised team as regards postings we hope to produce enor-frec Journals in the future. Having said that we will probably make a real nonsense of the whole thing Wc welcome comment. it spurs us to do better

I ditor

Journal of the A ustralian Naval Institute - Page 3

The following letter to Captain Robertson is printed for the interest of our members

2 Lucifer St., North BaJwyn Victoria. 3104

Dear Captain Robertson,

Your paper "The Battleship Mentality" -Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, February, 1976-was most interesting, as were the views you expressed in your review of the book "The Continental Commitment" (Journal of the AN1. November 1975). 1 would like to make some comments and hope you will take these in the spirit in which they are made-constructive contributions.

Firstly, you quote David Divine as saying "every major Admiralty and Fleet Appointment going to former Grand Fleet Officers, radical or innovative thinking was not encouraged." In my view, the facts show that Divine's statement is substantially incorrect. Every major Admiralty and Fleet appointment did not eo to former Grand Fleet Officers Whilst this depends to a certain extent, upon the definition of major appointment, the louowing are examples of Officers who later held major appointments and who were not Grand Fleet Officers:

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Reginald Yorke Tyrwhilt, Bt.. CinC China, and CinC Nore.

Admiral of the Fleet the Lord Wester Wemyss, First Sea Lord.

Admiral Sir W. A. Howard Kelly. CinC China, VAC lit BS and 2 i/c Mediterranean.

Examples of officers who served for only a short time in the Grand Fleet, and who liter held major com­mand etc. include:

Admiral of the Fleet Lord Keyes, CinC Med., CinC Portsmouth.

Admiral of the Reel the Rt. Hon. The Earl of Cork and Orrery. CinC Home Fleet. CinC Portsmouth.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir John D. Kelly, CinC Home Meet. CinC Portsmouth.

Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope. CinC Med.. First Sea Lord.

Secondly, 1 consider that there are a number of examples of Officers who did serve for extended periods in the Grand Fleet and went on to "think innovatively and radically". Examples include A.E.M. Chatfield, W.M. James. F.C. Dreyer, R.G H. Henderson, R.F. PhiUimore and H.W. Richmond. Indeed, far from discouraging Richmond's radical and innovative thinking, Bcatty asked to have him transferred from command of the (detached from the GF) battleship Commonwealth to the dread­nought Conqueror, where he would be back in the main body of the fleet.

Incidentally, you mention that H.W. Richmond "Had to resign". I am unable to trace this-it is not men­tioned in Marder's "Portrait of an Admiral". He was removed from at least one post (DTSD). However, so far as I can trace, he seems to have held all his major post war Flag Appointments for at least the customary tenure-Greenwich 2/20-2/23. CinC East Indies Station 12/23-12/25, Commandant Imperial Defence College 9/26-12/ 28. He retired on 1st April. 1931. at his own request,after 2Vt years on half pay. However, under the regulations then in force, he would have had to retire on 31st Decem­ber 1931 in any case (appendix to THE NAVY LIST. Jan. 1923. page 2282). I would be very grateful if you could help me by clarifying when Richmond resigned and from which post. His career interests me very much, and 1 have it in mind to prepare a short biography in due course.

Page 4-Journal of the Australian Neva! Institute

Reverting to David Divine, your quotations from his book reveal a further error on his part. This concerns Captain S.W. Roskill, RN, who. Divine says, was the son of in AdmiraLAccording to Who's Who. 1970, Roskill was the son of Mr. J.H. Roskill, KC. Frankly, Divine's inaccur­acies surprise me. as his MUTINY AT FNVERGORDON was well researched-1 had some correspondence with him on the subject.

A number of the comments in your paper interested me very much, in the context of the personal qualities needed to promote successfully the major changes in Urge organisations. Contrary to the views of many Naval Officers, major changes can be just as difficult to implement in large industrial, commercial or academic organisations as in the Armed Services. I am now preparing a lecture for the Victoria Chapter. Naval Historical Society, on this subject, building my theme around the Fisher-Beresfotd Controversy. In very general terms, J. A. Fisher had relative­ly little difficulty in producing new ideas (particularly for materiel improvements), but much greater difficulty in getting them introduced. // he could have persuaded Bcresford to sell his (Fisher's) ideas to the Fleet, the two would have been a formidable team. If you have any comments on this, I would be very grateful.

Yours sincerely.


Response by Captain Robertson

A reply has been made on the following lines:

"Roskill was the son of an eminent KC." This was a deliberate misstatement on my part to see if any one would take the trouble to look him up, or had read his books, and knew. I am delighted that you have bowled it out, but it is not David Divine's mistake.

The paragraph which troubles you is not a quote from Divine, it is taken largely from Roskill. Once again there is a deliberate misquote, the first one in more length. should read, "not until air power had spelled the doom of the entire conception of the battle fleet in the last war did senior officers of British Squadrons cast off the shackles which Hawke and Rodney had first loosened, and Nelson had shattered into fragments, but which were then sedulously refastened by his successors. It is one of the greatest puzzles of history how a service which has never ceased to worship the memory of Nelson has remained so blind to the chief reason for his successes, and after his death followed with almost monotonous regularity the opposite course to that which he himself adopted" (The Strategy of Seapowcr p 81). I have hinted at these decept-tions in the last paragraph of the defence.

The phrase "every major Admiralty and Grand Fleet appointment" should have been preceded by "practically" and its origin in a paper given at a Canadian seapowcr symposium (From Dreadnought to Polaris", USN1). The addition of the word "practically" would soften the phrase, but your correcting comment is well taken. There is little doubt in my mind, though, that the 20's and 30's were indeed a period of tactical sterility and Roskill is again relevant, (ibid p. 149) "The big gun was, however, still regarded as the principal arbiter in naval warfare" and goes on to mention the very low requirement placed on Naval air and the fact that RAF coastal command had no training in ASW, defence of convoys or attacks on enemy merchant shipping. The lack of develop­ment of ASDIC is a matter of record.

Richmond is a fascinating character and Beatty did have a lot of time for him at a Captain. "I am sorry Rich­mond has to go to the Admiralty, (from HMS Conqueror) , . . He has brains, has studied and will, I hope, be a great help to me. He is of an independent character, and will always say what he thinks, which is one of the reasons 1 could not get them to take him there before". But that was in 1918. In the 20's Richmond started questioning Beatty's policies on battleships and cruisers in the context of the various naval treaties, and wrote letters to the papers under the pseudonym "Admiral". Eventually he was in such conflict that the only honourable course left was to resign. Why was he placed on half pay so early?

The problem of making changes in any human organisation are well appreciated, and I have made a vesture towards this understanding in the second last para­graph of my article. Nor is conservatism always disadvant­ageous, but there ts a tendency tor it to become paramount, particularly in peacetime as resources dwindle. Chatfield, James. Dreyer, Hendersen, Richmond and Dewar may all have been capable of innovative thinking but there is not much evidence to suggest that they produced anything like the innovations of the USN, the Japanese, or the original thinking of the Germans (the "Z' plan) in the same period. I regret I do not know much about the Fisher-Beresford controversy so my comment on its effect would be suii.-cii.Lil. Roskfl) (ibid p. 101). and again (p. 140),

"The schisms produced in the Navy by Fisher's drastic methods took a long time to heal, and internal disunity in a fighting service must surely militate against efficient stair work and sound planning" may be of value. Yet the "party line" approach of the yean between the wars seems to have paralyzed any significant development too. Without wars it seems that the R.N. would not have been ready for World War 1 at all; so it all boils down to the trite thought that a balance has to be struck.

On looking up the paper about Richmond I find that I have an apology to make to its author, B.D. Hunt of the Royal Military College of Canada. In writing my own paper I have lifted whole sentences and phrases ver­batim without putting them in Quotes and acknowledging the source. The paper's full title is "Smaller Navies and Disarmament -Sir Herbert Richmond's Small Ship Theories and the Development of British Naval Pobcy in the 1920's".

The phrase "period of tactical sterility" is quoted by Hunt from Roskfll's "Naval Policy Between the Wars".

In going back to these sources I was reminded that Richmond was officially censured in 1929 in a letter drawing his attention to KR & AI's provisions about public comment on policy matters. Hunt says"(Rich­mond's) decision to publish his 'heresies' was made in the full knowledge that it would cost him his career" and he makes it plain from direct quotes from Richmond's letters that this was indeed the case.


Income and Expenditure Account for the year ended 30th September, 1976 (With 1974/7S figures for comparison)













Audit Fees


Joining Fees



Art Work




Bank Ch*r»r»



Journal Subscriptions


Hall Hire


Bank Interest

R 93


rentage it PO Box RrnUI



Printing* Stationery



Replacement Lock


Legal Feci


Surplus tor the year







Statement of Receipts and Payments for the year ended 30th September, 1976







Cash at Bank





Caah on Hand


Audit Fees


Bank Intereit



Art Work


Joining Feei


Bank Charges






Commonwealth Bonds


Journal Subscription!


Hall Hire




Postage It PO Bos Rental





Printing It Stationery Replacement Lock Legal Fees Cash on Hand

841.98 67.40

3370.36 3.00



Caab at Bank





Balance Sheet as at 30th September, 1976

Accumulated Fund






Balance at beginning ot year


Sundry Debtors


surplus tor the year



Commonwealth Bonds Cash on hand Cash at bank

309.31 672.63








Lieutenant Commander. RAN

Honorary Treasurer


Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Page 5

Officer Development

By REAR ADMIRAL G. R. GRIFFITHS, D.S.O., D.S.C. An Address to the Australian Naval Institute, Canberra, 29th September, 1976

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

This evening I would like 10 present to you some thoughts on the problems associated with producing officers lor the Navy in the future, though you will see as the talk progresses that much is relevant to the requirements of the present day officer.

The term 'officer development' is not original-a number of you will no doubt be aware that the Canadian forces have an officer develop­ment board which studies this important subject.

At present we do not have a term which em­braces the whole range of education and training activities which provides the individual officer with the necessary knowledge and professional ability to fulfill his duties at each level of respon­sibility. The term "the officer development process" seems to cover this.

But before we can explore the problem of officer development and determine some of the key factors in the development process it is essential to identify the duties or tasks which face the naval officer. Here we are looking for a broad definition of duties ashore and afloat-there will be some dif­ferences, some change of emphasis in certain aspects, but there will be a close inter-relation be­tween each as the whole effort of the individual officer, whether serving at sea or ashore, must con­tribute to the overall effectiveness of our naval forces.

These duties or tasks seem to fall into two main interrelated areas of responsibilities which increase with rank:

  1. firstly from the sea going aspect there is the professional command and management of the wide range of shore and fleet matters associated with the effecive conduct of naval and joint-service operations at sea in time of peace, emergency or war, and

  2. secondly from the shore service aspect there is the managerial work and direction associ­ated with such matters as force planning, equipment procurement, preparation of tact­ical doctrine, defence and strategic planning, personnel management and training, condi­tions of service, and logistic and maintenance support of the fleet.

Now against this background definition of the requirements placed on the officer ashore and afloat, let us consider how these demands and responsibilities increase with rank.

An important aspect of the military profes­sion is that the officer is required to broaden his

Page 6 -Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

experience in order to progress to higher levels of responsibilities. This is in contrast to a number of other professions where success lies more in high and relatively narrow specialisation. The career


Rear Admiral Guy Griffiths was born in Sydney on March 1923, and spent his early years in the Old Rothbury/Pokolbin district of the Hunter River Valley NSW. He entered the Royal Australian Naval College as a cadet midshipman in January 1937, aged 13. He was made Chief Cadet Captain in his final year, and on graduation to Midshipman in December 1940, was posted to the Royal Navy and joined the battlecruiser HMS Repulse in March 1941

In December 1941 HMS Repulse was sunk off the east coast of Malaya, and after rescue'Midshipman' Griffiths was posted to the battleship HMS Revenge. In January 1943 after service in the destroyer HMS Vivian he joined HMAS Shropshire on commissioning The next two years saw action in the South West Pacific including the Leytc and Lingayan Gulf opera­tions in the Philippines and the battle of Surigad Strait. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross after the Lingayan Gulf operation.

After the war he completed the Specialist Course in Gunnery at HMS Excellent. Portsmouth, and after two years exchange service returned to Australia From 1950-52 he served as Gunnery Officer in the carrier HMAS Sydney and saw action in the Korean War. At the end of 1952 he returned to the Korean theatre and saw further action in the destroyer Aniac.

In 1954 after undergoing the RN Staff course he served in HMAS Melbourne on commissioning in October 1955 to end 1956 when, on promotion to Commander, he was posted as Meet Operations Of fleer.

In 1961, after two years ahsorc in Navy Office he was posted in command of HMAS Parramatta on com­missioning which was the first of the new River Class DCs in the RAN This was followed by duty as the Director of Tactics and Weapons Policy at Navy Office Canberra.

In 1964 he was promoted to Captain and in Dec­ember 1965 took command of HMAS Hobart the second of the guided missile destroyers, on her first commission. The ship saw action in Vietnam and he was awarded the Distinguished Service Order.

Prom late 1967 he served in Malaysia as Naval Adviser to the Chief of Naval Staff Royal Malaysian Navy, and in 1970 attended the Imperial Defence College London.

In 1971 he was posted as Director General Operations and Plans at Navy Office Canberra, and was promoted Commodore in the same year, from late 1973 to mid 1975 he commanded th: aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne and in addition to normal operations participated in the Navy Help Darwin Oper­ation after Cyclone Tracy in January 197S. He was posted as Director General Personal Services in Novem­ber 1975.

On 30 June 1976 he was promoted Rear Admual and was appointed Chief of Naval Personnel on that date

process of the naval officer could be placed in the following stages:

a. The first stage covering the period as a sub­
lieutenant and a lieutenant is that in which the
officer is required to achieve the optimum standard
of ability in his branch and specialisation in relation
to his responsibilities at that level,

b. the second stage covers the period as a Lieu­
tenant-commander and Commander in which the
emphasis changes to include increasing demands for
managerial ability, to be developed concurrently
with the broader branch and specialisation ability
which comes with experience. In this stage employ­
ment generally covers the wider scope of the inter­
relation of branches and activities within the service,
and also enteres the policy making and join service

c. The third stage is seen to cover the period as
Captain and above and continues to demand a high
standard of professional and managerial ability
which increases with rank. In addition to single
service higher level managerial tasks ashore and
afloat, the officer is involved with the inter-relation
of the Navy in the national and international

As I see it, it is essential to have both the sea and shore responsibilities defined in the career stages for the level of responsibility with rank before you can begin to evolve a detailed plan for the officer development process. This should be a comprehensive plan covering all stages from the recruit onwards.

Indeed the recruit phase is most important for without it student material is not available to begin the officer development process. The effect­iveness of the recruiting activity will be reflected with the standard and number of applicants. Re­cruiting is not an easy matter and the policy estab­lished must take into account the problems of society as a whole, its changes and rate of change and the relationship between the defence force and society. It is essential that recruiting material shows to both the parents and youth, the scope of professional and management ability required by the naval officer especially at the middle and higher rank management levels. This must be done to present the career as a sufficient challenge to youth. If we miss out on presenting both the scope and the challenge the effect will be to lower the prestige of the occupation to a level which no longer attracts sufficient interest. It is of interest to look into some of the career guidance handbooks available in high schools at present to see how improvements can be made in this important area.

Now let us look at the development process which should be a comprehensive plan to educate, train and provide the experience necessary to equip the officer with the knowledge and develop his ability to perform the tasks we have just seen in the career stages just shown to you. At present we tend to refer to the various activities under the expres­sion 'officer training' but I feel it is necessary to

identify the various steps and I would like to deal with each in turn. The educational part of the plan seems to be a combination of:

a. Formalized education which is recognised
under normal national academic standards such as
the present tertiary education for selected degrees
and diplomas. It also includes,

b. the in-house service education which covers
specific naval subjects which form the basis for
subsequent training. An example of this would be
the present principle warfare course and the supply
officers charge course,

c. the training phase is carried out ashore and
afloat and consolidates both formal and service
education within the requirements of the naval
environment, and lastly,

d. the remaining integral part of the develop­
ment programme is the experience provided by the
naval officers career plan. Such a career plan should
provide a range of postings at sea and ashore to
enable each officer to gain the necessary experience
to develop his potential for higher rank and further

1 would now like to deal with the formal education part of the development process, and it is important for us to remember that we are think­ing about the standard of education required to equip officers for middle and higher management duties in the Navy not only at the present time but also in the period say from 1990 and beyond. A senior entry cadet who begins his career in Jan. 1977 could be a Captain in about 1999.

In 1962 the Weeden Committee was estab­lished to review periodically the academic syllabus and academic problems at the RANC. As a result of the first meeting of the committee the firm recommendation was made that technical officers should carry out degree training in Australia and the committee also went on to recommend that the best of the executive and supply branch cadets should have an opportunity to undertake a univer­sity degree course in science, arts, law, economics and commerce. These recommendations were pro­cessed and in August 1964 it was agreed that the then training scheme for officers should include engineering, science and arts degrees to be under­taken at the University of NSW, and action was taken to implement this in January 1966. Many of you will remember that Sir Leslie Martin headed a Committee in the late 1960's also to look into the education of service officers, and in the committee report the following statement was included:

"As to the type of education required all evidence we have heard indicates that the basic requirement in the three services is for education in social sciences, the humanities. the physical sciences and engineering. " In addition the report also stated:

"We have no doubt that there is a genuine

and increasing need in the services for officers

who have followed appropriate courses of tertiary

education leading to a recognised academic qualif

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Page 7

ication. Pressures similar to those that have led the community to place a growing emphasis on tertiary education are evident also in the profes­sion of arms. Service officers of the future must be more than leaders of men schooled in the tech­niques and disciplines unique to their professions. They will be concerned with sophisticated and in­creasingly complex equipment and weapons sys­tems, and with technical measures and counter measures that require in varying degrees an under­standing of the ideas, phenomena and vocabulary of science. To participate as many will be required to in the formulation and communication of national defence and security policies, they must have an educated understanding of the political and governmental systems, the history and econ­omics of their own and other countries and of international relations. They must have particular skill in the process of management. They must be articulate and be able to communicate and col­laborate with specialists at home and abroad, in fields such as foreign affairs, economics, industry, science, labour and finance. For their contributions to be effective, their knowledge and understanding of these matters must be at a level that will gain the respect and recognition of those with whom they will be dealing."

An outside and somewhat independent thought is expressed in a paper on 'Educating for the Profession of Arms' by Professor Patridge whose paper has been published by the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre ol the ANU. In the paper the following two statements are made:

"In America type countries the prestige of occupations tends to be closely related to the level <education necessary to gain access to them. And there are many both in Britain and the United States who believe that the military profession will be­come less capable of attracting .'he necessary num­ber of intellectually able and ambitious young men unless that profession also like law, medicine, en­gineering, management and the rest, presents itself as one of the learned or at least highly educated professions."

"Civilians in politics and administration who are professionally involved in the making of defence policy tend to be men who speak the language of the social scientists. And one argument that is some­times heard in Britain and also in the United States is that if the military is to be able to hold its own in the discussion and determination of policy con­cerning military security, it too should have men able to talk the language of the social scientists capable of acquiring educated understanding of the political, economic and social forces and cir­cumstances, national and international, which bear directly on military policy and activity. This of course is a mode of thinking more compelling in a great world power like the United States than it might be in a very small country like Australia. Nevertheless it also has its relevance to Australian circumstances."

Pane 8 - Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

From these statements that I have presented to you there is a strong thrust which shows that tertiary education should be regarded as the basic requirement for the military officer for the future. No doubt there would be many difficulties in achieving this for every officer in the Naval service. Nevertheless we have to be careful to ensure we have an adequate number of officers who have completed this level of education. A further aspect has also been presented by authorities cautions against accepting the initial attainment of a tertiary degree as the one shot education process in an officer's career. While experience has already shown that part of the officer development process requires a series of courses throughout his career, these courses in the main have been on service oriented subjects only. In the future it may well be necessary to modify the whole process to a con­tinuing education plan to include an updating of the original tertiary level if only in conjunction with a service education process, the whole being graded to meet requirements as the officer progress­es. At present I understand that engineers are con­sidered out of date about 5-7 years after graduation.

In spite of the weight of evidence in support of the need for tertiary education for our future officers, many question the need for a degree quali­fication as a basic requirement. This stems mainly from the line of reasoning which is based on ques­tioning the applicability of the present degrees, science and arts, to the tasks in the seaman and supply branches. I personally feel this is a narrow view which looks no wider than the sense in which the tertiary qualification can be applied to Navy as distinct from defence matters, and even then at a level below policy making level. I also believe it to be wrong, that future naval officers, not soqualified, should be asked to compete in an environment in which almost all their non-naval peers and profes­sional colleagues will have this basic standard of education.

I have spent some time on formal education because I feel that it is a most important aspect of the officer development process and one which should be looked at as objectively as possible. Present day discussion seems to raise some emotive issues and comments mainly from those who have not completed a tertiary education phase. In look­ing towards the future and the position of the Navy and its officers in the technological age with its rapid rate of change, I feel we must be very careful to make the right decision and provide the means whereby a majority of officers are equipped with a nationally recognised level of tertiary education at the beginning of or during the officer develop­ment process.

I would now like to move to service education and this field is seen as covering most courses for officers of each branch of the general list which are conducted mainly in service training establishments to development knowledge in their professional field. For example, for the seaman branch, this

would include courses for principle warfare officers, tactical courses, advanced warfare courses, and for the engineering branch it includes application courses and for the supply branch it includes the supply officer's charge course. It also covers staff courses.

This education is an essential part of the officer development process and should be graded to provide the background which is needed by officers as they progress through stages of increas­ing professional responsibilities. This is done at present. For example the seaman Lieutenant after an initial period at sea consolidating basic learning in various ships but probably spending the majority of the time in PBF's and LCH's, will then be selected for a principal warfare officers course. This provides him with the knowledge to fit him for operational duties in destroyers.

It will be necessary to keep this aspect in constant review to ensure that future requirements are determined and thai the associated service education process is implemented in sufficient rime to produce the officers required.

Staff courses have always formed an essential part of the service education process. These consist of the single service Naval staff course, taken at the Loli level. Regrettably we do not run our own in Australia and must, at present, put officers through the RN staff course in penny numbers. The next step is the JSSCin Canberra which processes officers at Commanders level, and finally there is the RCDS in London for officers at the Captain and Com­modore level.

Staff college training already presents us with problems at the Senior Lieutenant/Lieutenant Commander level. At present we are not processing sufficient officers through this important course which should be providing them with the additional knowledge on management matters and manage­ment processes to fit them to move into the second stage of their career. Consequently many Naval officers are disadvantaged with respect to their Army and Air Force equivalents where staff train­ing for the majority is a mandatory step in the requirements for higher rank.

The training part of the development process overlaps service education to some extent and at present is conducted under officers training policy. It is carried out ashore and afloat in dedicated training establishments and in ships of the fleet in­cluding one training ship. In the shore establish­ments use is made of ships equipment specially provided for training purposes, and special training materials and training aids. Of these the computer based simulator is probably the most advanced at the present time. Ideally at sea the major portion of training should be carried out in dedicated training ships. This would allow the greater portion ul operational sea time to be devoted to achieving the best possible degree of operational effectiveness in individual ships and in the fleet as a whole.

Training consolidates the knowledge gained in the education process by practical application in the service environment. This has to be related to the tasks and responsibilities of the officer at the various stages of his career.

Obviously there is a compromise between the amount of training effort expended ashore and the amount of on-the-job-training necessary at sea before the officer can be considered proficient to perform his duties. On the other hand one has to weigh up the costs of providing the facilities ashore against the costs of training at sea. Generally I feel there is scope for providing better training aids ashore particularly in the use of simulators and I consider that this action would prove economically viable. 1 would not want you to assume that these observations refer only to training in the seaman branch, as I am sure that investigations would show a range of application to the other branches.

The last part of the development process involves officer career planning. This should ensure that the officer is posted through a range of billets in order to provide him with experience and to develop his ability and potential for higher rank responsibilities. This does not necessarily mean that each officer in the particular branch and specialisation must pass through an identical sequence of posts. Time in rank and the availability of billets at sea and ahsore would dictate against this. Career planning as part of the development process is at present, and will certainly remain in the future, a complex task. It involves assessment of job performance, officer potential, job state­ments, officer qualification and so on.

Before I conclude let me summarise

a. Firstly there was the identification of the
tasks facing the officer ashore and afloat;

b. secondly, we covered the staged development
of the officer from the time he began, mainly in
the pure professional naval aspects of his branch
which then widened to encompass more managerial
responsibilities and then continued with an increas­
ing demand for professional and managerial
knowledge and ability;

c. thirdly, I mentioned recruiting as an import­
ant item without which we are unlikely to obtain
the right material for officer development. In
recruiting we must present the scope and challenge
of the Naval officers career and always bear in
mind thai we are competing in the national market;

d. fourthly, 1 covered the various aspects of
the development process wich need to be formed
into a comprehensive plan to educate, train, and
provide the officer with experience. This covered
the aspects of formal education, service education,
training, and officer career planning.

That concludes what can only be regarded as an outline of the complex matter of officer development. Nevertheless I trust it gives you food for thought. I wish to add that the views expressed are my own personal ones and are not official. I will be happy to answer any questions.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute-Page 9

Training The General List Officer

Some Problems and Possibilities


This article has been submitted by a subordinate officer who is at present undertaking training at the Royal Australian Naval CoBege, as it provides an insight into the way in which the present training patterns appears to some­one actually undergoing that training. For those not fam­iliar with the pattern of training at RANC. the descrip­tion taken from the RANC Handbook for 1976 is pro­vided at the end of the article.

The Present Position

Since 1974 the Royal Australian Naval Col­lege has been operating under a scheme designed as an attempt to give the officers under training the best all-round education possible.

Two entries go to make up the officers who are selected for each tertiary course. These are the Junior Entry, who enter between the ages of 15 and 17 and complete their last two years of second­ary schooling at the Naval College, and Senior Entry, who enter after the age of 17, having already matriculated.

Senior Entry join the Naval College at the beginning of February each year and undergo a short indoctrination and familiarization course (two days in 1976) before joining the just-matriculated Junior Entry of two years previous. Both then undergo the Specialization and Tertiary Education Programme (STEP). This course lasts just over a week, and is the means whereby the student officers are informed of the various brarches and specializa­tions open to them. It consists of lectures on the general organization of the RAN and its rank structure, on each branch and specialization by a qualified officer and outlines of career patterns and training schemes. To this, if it can be arranged, is added a day at sea to get the 'feel of the real thing! In 1975 a day on board Stuart at Garden Island was arranged for Senior Entry only, while in 1976 they were sent aboard Swan in Jervis Bay. Junior Entry were left out of this since it was thought, quite reasonably, that they should a ready have a good idea of the subject.

As can be seen from the diagram there are four degrees and the "Creswell Course' for each officer to choose from. The only real restrictions on choice are: first, eyesight; second, matriculation results-for a cadet who has only just scraped a pass will inevitably be refused permission to undertake

Page 10-Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

the degrees of Bachelor of Engineering or Electrical Engineering; and third, the Bachelor of Arts degree, undertaken entirely at the University of New Sbuth Wales is limited to eight places a year (it is in the process of being increased to twelve).

Cadets's Reasons for Selecting Courses-Junior & Senior Entries

Why do cadets select the branches they do? The reasons seem to be entirely different for either entry. Junior Entry, after two years at the Naval College, have a marked tendency to select the Sea­man Branch and avoid the others. There are several causes for this tendency. First, a significant propor­tion of Junior Entry join with the definite thought in mind that they will be able to get to sea with a minimum of further scholastic effort. The bulk of these cadets originally approached the Navy with the intention of joining as Junior Recruits to enter "Leeuwin" but, because of their abilities were per­suaded to try for the Naval College instead. On the whole, they do not like the thought of a degree tacked on to their secondary schooling and seek a different way. The second reason is that many cadets who joined with the original intention of doing a degree, baulk at the thought of three or four more years hard work after the two they have completed. If they do a degree it will be Arts or Science, the shorter and easier ones. It is difficult to say whether the Navy loses out on these cadets* potential. Certainly a source of possible engineers has dried up but very few of this type of cadet leaves the Navy in the immediate period-these officers will provide a return of service. Further­more, if it is admitted that, had they joined as Senior Entry, these men would have begun BE or BEE studies, would they not have been among the many who drop out through lack of motivation on the way. It is a very difficult question and one that admits of no easy answer. The third reason is that. from no apparent source, cadets tend to pick up a dislike for the Supply Branch. No attempts by the authorities could eradicate this dislike, it is probably one that has existed as long as the College and it is an unfortunate fact that the crowning insult at the Naval College is "You'd make a good supply officer"

To give an example of the Junior Entry's tendency towards the Seaman Branch; of the 27 Junior Entry who underwent STEP in 1976, 2 selected the Supply Branch, 7 the Instructor Branch, none the Engineering, 3 the Electrical Engineering Branch and 21 the Seaman. The balance of figures in the Senior Entry is quite the reverse.

Senior Entry on the whole seem much more 'degree motivated'. There has been something of a problem with the number of SE's who join ap­parently with the idea of getting a degree in mind and little thought or knowledge of the Navy as a career. As a result of more careful screening this sort of thing is now happening a great deal less often.

But it is true that Senior Entry are more in­terested in degrees for their own sakes than Junior Entry. It is notorious at the College that Junior Entry do not volunteer for Mechanical Engineering while Senior Entry are fairly keen on the idea and while Arts is a great favourite with many Junior entry because it is done completely away from the Naval College and is fairly easy, Senior Entry of the same calibre go more for Science. Whether this is a good thing or not is hard to say, for many who go for the more difficult degrees drop by the way­side and the number of each entry completing their degree generally ends up approximately even. The Creswell Course

Apart from the four degrees there is the programme of tertiary studies known as the 'Cres­well Course' conducted by the Naval College. It was designed specifically with the less academically inclined Seaman and Supply officers in mind and is intended to provide a good 'all-round' education in the least possible time. It was, until 1974, a course of 15 months, after which the officers in­volved went to the training ship, and then to the fleet. After a year's sea time they return to the College for one term of navigation and preparation for (he Promotion Parade on promotion to Acting Sub-Lieutenant. Tile New Course

The 'Creswell Course' has now been extended to two years, with a six-week training course during the second year. This is followed by six months of courses at various establishments and further time in the training ship, after all of which they join the Fleet for six months.

In the writer's opinion the expanded course has been a failure. The general air of those under­going the programme has seemed to be one of las­situde and boredom. The course appears excellent on paper but has the terrible trouble of not only being lengthy but also completely unique. This uniqueness means that there is no way of compar­ing the Creswell Course with any course of outside tertiary studies, especially as an officer graduates with no qualifications and no recognition of the course as being of diploma status: but it is difficult, bearing in mind the lack of comparable civilian

diplomas, to see what effect this will have on those outside the Navy who will deal with graduates of the Creswell Course.

What makes things worse is that the Creswell Course always used to be the way, not only for non-academic officers, but also for those who were disinclined for study to get to sea early. Now the officers undergoing the Creswell Course find that they are stuck at RANC for nearly two and a half years with only two short cruises and short courses at Penguin. Watson and Cerberus to enliven proceed­ings. This means that they get to sea only six months earlier than their degree-stream contemporaries and end up with no qualifications to boot.

Furthermore, while degree students have a fair degree of freedom and generally have a very good time at Universtiy, the Creswell Course officers find themselves trapped in the Naval College 20 miles from Nowra and 120 miles from Sydney with relatively limited leave.

The situation of the College is a great factor in the failure of the Creswell Course. It is possible for a cadet to spend four and a half years at the Naval College. When one considers that many join Junior Entry with the idea of getting to sea as early as possible it becomes obvious that problems emerge.

Apart from the courses there are many pro­blems of organization within the College. The bulk of these are caused by the system of two entries. To deal fairly with Senior Entry it is necessary to give them privileges and seniority on a par with their contemporaries in the Junior Entry within the least possible time and this is the source of much ill-feeling within the two pre-matriculation years of Junior Entry. Furthermore may feel that the privilege system-by which the senior classes are granted more leave and freedom-is a hangover from the 13-year old entry and treats cadets more as schoolboys than officers.

Furthermore, in order not to give Junior Entry too great an edge over Senior Entry, it is necessary to limit the naval training of Junior Entry and this is rather an annoyance to many.

All in all the system of two entries is iniqui­tous and must be stopped. Junior Entry, though an excellent producer of naval officers, must go for it is an anachronism and by its very presence is tending to turn Creswell into something rather like a U.S. military high-school rather than a profession­al Naval College. Standards of Training

It is well-known that desperate attempts are being made to improve seamanship and other as­pects of Naval training above elementary standard, but how can this be done in the present situation?

For example, the 1975 Junior Entry did not get into a warship larger than a landing craft for their entire first year! And this in Jervis Bay! Certainly no fault of the College's, this, I feel, is rather more the responsibility of the Fleet as a Journal of the Australian Saval Institute-Page 11

whole. It seems that the Fleet want to both have their cake and eat it for thy quite correctly com­plain that officers from the College lack a deal of service knowledge. To quote RADM. MacDonald, then Commodore C of S to FOCAF in 1970, who was summarizing the results of a survey con­ducted among senior officers of the Fleet:

"The main professional shortcomings appear to be in General Service knowledge, leader­ship, Fleetwork and Midshipman's sea train­ing".

Now RADM MacDonald was referring prin­cipally to technical officers when he talked about a lack of general service knowledge but in view of the similarity of the training patterns of the various branches it could be said to apply to all degree-stream officers and, to a lesser extent, to the Cres-well Course and, when you consider that a Cadet can spend a year at the College and not get to sea, It is not an unreasonable comment.

Why don't cadets get to sea? The system is that the RANC asks ships entetingthe Bay if they can lake any cadets for a visit or sea-day. Of late the answer would always seem to be NO. This is quite unreasonable, for while the Fleet expects Midshipmen joining to have some knowledge and 'feel' of the situation it does not want to see them beforehand. The excuse is ntade that the half-day or full-day visits are of dubious value and thai they are extremely disruptive to the ships' concerned but this attitude must change. Admittedly having a party on board is a nuisance but the Fleet must realise that to make omelettes it must break a few eggs heavy work-up programmes or not.

The next problem with more advanced Naval training is the ever chronic lick of equipment. Great advances have been made in the field of boat handling over the past twelve months (due mainly to extensive pressuring by the College) witti the acquisition of two fast 35' seaboats and other types. Practice on these boats will give the Midshipman some idea of boat work when he joins the fleet and much more confidence when he comes to run boats from his ship.

But other than this the College has no real facilities-no modern navigation equipment or other training aids. And with the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) scheduled to (at the moment) begin within ten years the Naval College is not likely to receive any.

As one can see, then, the College is labouring under terrific disadvantages and many drastic changes must be made to remove them. Proposals for Future Training

Appreciating the faults in the present train­ing system, the training staff at the Naval College have proposed to Navy Office (or whatever it is called now!) that the order of training be reorgan­ised.

What the College suggested was that both entries, in their first post-matriculation year, do

their basic naval training and a cruise in Duchess for their first six months and then go to sea as Midshipmen in the Reel for a further half year. After this, and only after this, would each officer choose his branch and begin his academic training.

Such a training system would be a vast im­provement on the present one and would certainly relieve the criticsm of officers coming out to the Fleet on completion of their degrees with little or no knowledge of the Service. Furthermore it would give each officer the chance to see each branch at work and to decide whether or not he would be suited to his particular choice before he is com­mitted to it.

However there is another way, a far more radical change in the training system but one that could well be a vast improvement on the present or other proposed methods.

The first basic premise is that the idea of ADFA, in its present form, should be dropped. At the moment it acts only as a hindrance to officer training in all three services as it is deferred further and further into the future. It is possible that the idea could be revived as a joint-service Staff College for Lieutenant-Commanders and the equivalent but it is difficult to see what improvement the present conception of ADFA could possibly be on the services' individual methods.

As to the scheme of training there should only be the single entry, a post-matriculation one from the ages of 17 to 20 years. This entry would spend six months doing extensive professional training-drill, organization,boat work, navigation, and so on. A minesweeper or a patrol boat should be attached to the College purely and simply for day or week-running with Cadets. At the end of this six-month period an officer should emerge with the basics of his profession. All branches should undergo this training and at the same time. It should be impressed upon the Cadets that they are officers, albeit under training, and that they should act and be treated accordingly-it would be a great retainer of the doubtful if a real sense of 'esprit de corps' could be built up among the new entries.

After this six months the class would be sent to the training ship for three months. This time would be conducted in the same way that it is in HMAS Duchess at present with Cadets performing a variety of duties in the ship as she cruises in home or foreign waters.

Following their cruise the class would return to the College for two further months of advanced work-navigation, weapons, tactics and so on.

After this the Cadets would be given at least one month's leave, be promoted Midshipmen and posted to ships of the Fleet for a year's sea time. During this year they would do their task-book and begin to work towards Watch-Keeping Certifi­cates in their particular branch. Officers of every branch should undergo this part of the training

Page 12- Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

scheme because it would be of immense value to every officer to be able to spend a couple of months in different departments (o his own and a full year at sea would enable this to be done in more than the present rather sketchy basis. Al­though the trainee officers would only be super­numeraries, of little use to the department con­cerned, the exercise would pay handsome dividends in a wider general knowledge.

The end of this year would be the beginning of the specialist training. The Mechanical and Electrical Engineers would either, if academically clever, go immediately to a degree or else up to a more job-oriented diploma course at RM1T. Fol­lowing this they would return to sea to work in their departments.

Supply Officers would similarly be divided into two. Those who wished to could avail them­selves of the opportunity to do a BA or BSc while the remainder would return to the College for a year's tertiary studies directly linked to their pro­fession in such fields as languages and the law. This year and the six months supply courses to follow would be the last stage of their training and at its finish they would begin their work in the Supply Branch.

The problem now comes with Seaman officers. Shoud they get their Watch-Keeping Cer­tificate before any tertiary training? I think so. After the year as Midshipmen those in the Seaman Branch should be promoted to Acting Sub-Lieuten­ant and do a further year at sea to gain their Ticket. When this has been accomplished they would be given the choice of doing a BA or a BSc combined with an Operations and Weapons Course to last three years or else a course similar to the Supply Officers' with OW. instead of supply training in­volved. After completing their chosen course they would return to sea as watch-keeping officers.

This proposed system of training means that it will take a year more than at present to produce a fully qualified degree officer (compare diagrams I and 2) but would the result not be worth that year? There would be no difficulties of two entries or Degree versus Creswell Course because all officers would have the option of doing a degree some­time in their careers and the matter would depend simply upon the inclinations of the officer con­cerned.

A much more professional officer would be produced with a wide-ranging knowledge of the various fields of activity within the Navy and, no matter what the course or branch, an intelligent and well-spoken man should emerge. While it could be argued that the year's tertiary studies are not likely to have any greater success than the Creswell Course, it must be said that the proposed studies will not only be much shorter but also much more relevant to a junior officer than at the moment-if necessary more complex studies can come at a later stage in a man's should be possible to introduce a system of later degrees and post-

graduate studies in a fashion similar to that of the United Ststes Navy.

Are there any other possible disadvantages? Three main arguments may be presented against the proposed system. First, officers doing degrees would have at least a two year interval between matriculating and beginning their university studies. The answer to this is that it is being increasingly felt around the universities that matriculants should spend a couple of years away from the academic world before beginning their degrees. This would mean that the person concerned would be very much more 'motivated' on recommencing his studies and it is felt that this would apply as well to naval officers as to civilians.

It is in this area that the principal difference and advantage over the new College proposals comes into effect. There is a danger with the single year Stage 1 training that officers will not be able to ex­perience the full responsibilities and duties of their career ahead and this would apply to Seaman Officers to a great extent-there is a great differ­ence between being Midshipman of the Watch and Officer of the Watch. To have officers get their Tickets before returning to University would mean that they would come back with a great deal more confidence in themselves and the Navy and enable them to really know whether they like their future.

The second criticism is that the time spent in the Fleet would result in a need for more training billets-already at a premium and more training staff in the ships themselves. The cry would be that there is no space remaining in the Fleet for more officers under training and this, seemingly, is quite true. Yet is it necessary for a ship to be at sea, or even operational, for an officer to do his time in the supply branch? Do all the ships used need to be big ones? For example, with an average class of 60, would it not be possible to spread a Mishipman or two on a rotating basis to (he Patrol Boats and Minesweepers; for few as they arc, these ships ought to be able to take 20. While it can be argued that these ships would not be able to give the right training they would provide an invaluahle insight into small ship life that engineers and supply officers might never have again. As for the other places, it is hard to think that Midshipmen have ever expected, or got, palatial accommodation so it should be quite possible to squeeze a few more into each ship. As to the increase in training staff, it must be stressed that the emphasis for this first year at sea would be an observation and 'learn by example' training rather than formal tuition so the workload should nnt he ureatly increased.

The third difficulty is that of pay rates. Under the present system a return to university after gaining their Watch Keeping Ticket would mean a return to under-training rates for the Seaman officers. This is merely a matter of chang­ing Ore relevant instructions and is simply a triviality. Journal of the A ustralian Naval Institute - Page 13

That then is the proposal for a new training scheme. Admittedly it will take more time and effort than the present methods but it would go far to solve many of the College's problems. How does it seem to you?


The duration of the course of training for any group of student officers vane* with the type of entry and with the course of studies to which the group is committed

Cadet midshipmen of the junior entry spend one year in Class Jl and a second year in Class 12 undertaking studies in preparation for New South Wales Higher School Certificate examinations. During these two years cadets are required to participate in character building activities-and they receive elementary naval training. Subject to satis­factory performance in Higher School Certificate examin­ations they are advanced to Class I at the beginning of their third year

Student officers of the senior entry are placed in Class I on joining the College and. in compter] with Class I officers from the junior entry, are streamed into BA. BSc, BL or Creswell courses

Before this can be done, it is necessary to allocate student officers to branches of the Navy (Seamen. Engin­eering, Supplj, and Secretarial, or Instructor) since admis­sion to certain branches is conditional upon success in specific courses, lor this reason the first part of the aca­demic year for Class I is devoted lo acquainting students generally with the implications following upon the choice of a branch and Id counselling ihem individually with a view lo channelbng each one to a course which is suited to his ability and aspirations An o'ficer may express his own preference for a particular branch and considerable weight is given to his preference but final allocation is at the discretion of the naval authorities.

Student officers selected for the BA course take the whole three-year courseal Ihe University of New South Wales and arc (ranferred to the university for this purpose after a short period of naval training at RAN College.

Those selected for BSc or Bl. courses remain at RAN College for one year during which they undertake first year university studies. Subject lo successful com­pletion of first year studies they proceed to the University of New South Wales for the balance of their courses two years to complete BSc or three years to complete HI

While studying at the university, the student officer undergoes naval training during pan of the university vacations. After completion of the university course, a junior officer undertakes further full-time naval training lo fit him in all respect for appointment to HMA fleet but this phase of training is not the responsibility of RAN College.

Student officers selected for the Creswell course spend four semesters at RAN College undertaking aca­demic studies at tertiary level together with a small amount of concurrent naval training The fifth semester, which is devoted to naval training includes a period of seven weeks in a training ship and shorter periods of specialised naval training at HMAS Cerberus and HKKS Watson Successful completion of this five-semester program is followed by further naval training in ships of HMA Fleet and in shore establishments. This latter phase of training is not the re­sponsibility of RAN College


And the Lord said unto Noali, "Where is the ark which 1 have commanded thee to build?"

And Noah said unto the Lord, "Verily, I have had three carpenters off ill. The gopher wood supplier halh lei me down-yea, even though the gopher wood hath been on order for nigh upon 12 months. What can I do, 0 Lord?"

And God said unto Noah, "1 want that ark finished even after seven days and seven nights."'

And Noah said, "It will be so."

And il was not so. And the Lord said unto Noah, "What seemeth lo be the trouble this lime?"

And Noah said unto the Lord, "My subcontract­or hath gone out of business. The pitch which Thou commandest me to put on the outside and on the inside of the ark hath not arrived. The plumber hath gone on strike. Shem, my son who helpeth me on the ark side of the business, hath formed a pop group with his brothers Ham and Japheih. Lord. 1 am undone."

And the Lord grew angry' and Midi "And what about the animals, the male and the female of every sort that I ordered to come unto thee to keep their seed alive upon the face of the earth?"

And Noah said, "They have been delivered unto the wrong address bui should arriveth on Friday."

And the Lord said, "How about the unicorns. and the fowls of the air by sevens?"

And Noah wrung his hands and wept, saying, "Lord, unicorns are a discontinued line: ihou cansl noi get them for love or money. And fowls of the air are sold only in half-dozens. Lord, Lord. Thou knowest how it is."

And the Lord in His wisdom said, "Noah, my son, I knowest. Why else dost thou think I have caused a flood to descend upon the earth'*"

-ERA-Journal ol Eastern Region of the Royal Institute of British Architects

"Of all the public services, that of the Navy is the one in which tampering may be of the greatest danger, which can worst be supplied in an emer gency, and of which any failure draws after it the largest and heaviest train of consequences.

Page 14 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Edmund Burke: To the House of Commons


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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute-Page 15

Pearl Harbour

This address was given to the Sydney Chapter before viewing the film Tora, Ton. Ton by Lcdr. W, M. Swan RAN (Ret) on 11 April 1976. It is printed in this edition as 7th December 1976 is the 35th

Anniversary of the attack.

INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS: Prepared by a member of the Naval Historical Society. The film you are about to see poses 3 important questions: 1 How much did the U.S. know of Japan's intentions on the eve of Pearl Harbour?

  1. Were the Commanders in Hawaii derelict in their duty when they failed to anticipate the raid on Pearl H?

  2. Was there a conspiracy in t^e White House to manoeuvre the Japanese into war, and thus bring America into war against Germany & Italy?

Six major investigations, including a marathon Congressional Committee have examined these questions; but doubts still linger on them all.


In February '41, in reply to a question by State Dept., USN Intelligence (ONI) replied: "Based on known data regarding the present dis­position & employment of Japanese Naval & Army forces, no move against P.H. appears imminent or planned for the foreseeable future." However, despite this, secret planning for just such an attack started in Tokyo about this time. The main US Intelligence on Japan came from signal intercepts, in the breaking of which the Americans were very successful. They not only broke the Japanese diplomatic code in 1940, and constructed its machine, but were reading the Japanese Navy's secret messages long before 1941. They held all the variants of the Japanese Fleet Code, the SA Code for the Japanese call sign list, the precious AD Code of the Japanese Admirals, as well as a Met Code and a Japanese Joint Planning Board Code. Fantastic intelligence. One would think all Japan's secrets were known to the Americans in 1941. Yet none of this material gave direct evidence of an attack in peacetime on the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl. It is true there were clues, hints, of such an attack in MAGIC intercepts from 15 Feb. 41 onwards, it must be remembcied that hundreds of intercepted messages piled up in in-trays in Wash­ington for weeks before the attack, calling for such top secret work that not enough special personnel were available. Then there was the human situation of Army versus Navy versus State versus White House, with harassed officers running around 24 hours a day trying to pass on vital information to seniors with the need-to-know, and being scoffed at or sent to someone else in another building. It

Page /ft Journal of the Australian Vaval Institute

could be said that the Americans should have paid more attention to Japanese directives, to Consul-Genera! Kita in Hawaii, to "Secure intelli­gence even by bribing your informants". There were delays. The Americans took 26 days to process the first of these. Another was in an officer's in-tray for 43 days before he got around to trans­lating it. This also concerned Hawaii. Although these two incidents were some months prior to the attack, there were no doubt other delays nearer 7th December, one of which concerned a secret clerk who picked a long Japanese message out of a'Deferred' pack and started to process it herself. Finding it concerned Japanese signals to be sent by spies on Hawaii, even bonfires, she went excitedly to her boss, who told her to go home as it was Saturday, and "We'll finish the editing some time next week." You are going to have human error.

It's easy to be wise after the event. The truth was that such an attack was too incredible to swallow. A Cmdr. McCollum, in ONI at the time, doubted the Japanese had any aggressive designs on Pearl Harbour. It did not make sense to him. He told Colonel Bratton, another intercept wizard, "They know as well as you and I that the fleet would not be just sitting there waiting to be attack­ed." And of course the Americans just could not believe they would be attacked before a declaration of war. The answer to this question can be summed up in the words of the Judge-Advocate-General in his later report to the Secretary of War, "A keener and more incisive analysis by the Intelligence sect­ions of either Service of the overall picture present­ed by these intercepts might have led to an antici­pation of the possibility, at least, of an attack on

Pearl Harbour at or about the time it actually occur­red." Finally, what of the actual naval orders for the attack? Did the Americans intercept anything on the 32 ship Task Force steaming acorss the Pacific to attack them? No, they did not;because the Japanese were too clever. Several codes, inclu­ding the Admirals'.were suddenly changed and, when the time came, Admiral Yamamoto radioed NIITAKA YAMA NOBORE, which means ASCEND MOUNT NIITAKA. which in turn meant LAUNCH THE ATTACK ON THE ENEMY AS PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED. So even if the Americans had broken this message, they would not have known where the blow would fall.


NO. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were not derelict in their duty. They had received serious warnings from Washington. Bui it was peacetime, 7.00 a.m. on a Sunday, when the fleet of a democracy not at war would be at its lowest state of readiness. The same for the soldiers and aircraft ashore The Japanese chose their time well. There were church services to attend, and some ships had their watertight doors open for an in­spection. Once again, it's easy to be wise in hind­sight, and say those WT. doors should have been closed. The Commanders probably thought the Japanese would strike south, not east, and after a declaration of war-not before. The Commanders were told a great deal, but of course they could not be shown or told everything because much precious equipment was not in Hawaii. Some officers in Washington tried to send them more, and one was told when he attempted to do so that he would be insulting Admiral Kimmel. On 27th November, '41 Alert No. 3 Message (a high priority warning)- was sent to the two Commanders, and read as follows: "JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT." The Navy Dept. followed this up with a signal to the Admiral stat­ing this Presidential Alert No. 3 was a War Warning, and that certain measures were to be executed against a possible Japanese aggressive move in the next few days. Admiral Kimmel might be criticised here for not having the ships in Pearl on a war footing; but the answer to this question is still considered to be NO, as he implemented all the steps required by Alert No. 3.

Strangely enough, on the night before the attack Colonel Bratton, in Washington, asked Commander McCollum if the Japanese might attack Pearl Harbour, and McCollum replied that, "No major units of Admiral KimmePs fleet are at Pearl."

"Are you sure these people are properly alerted''" Bratton asked. "Are they on the job? Have they been properly warned?"

"Oh yes." McCollum replied, "The fleet is either gone or is about to go to sea."

Unfortunately, the Japanese had different Information.


A book has been written on this theme, and several articles have appeared in magazines.

In the opinion of this research officer, no such conspiracy existed, not would one have been possible. The target here is President Roosevelt, and this seems an attempt to discredit him and topple him from his secure place in history. Actually F.D.R. was rarely given a copy of all this Intelli­gence, being shown them as necessary. From June to end September '41 he did not see any at all. In November '41 he started to knock the Navy's and Army's heads together, and asked for copies of intercepts. But the President was more interested in diplomatic Intelligence rather than military. In addition to which he was very busy with a host of other matters, and his health occupied some of his time. It is considered that F.D.R. thought the Japanese were on the brink of going to war, and would strike at Thailand, the Philippines or the Dutch East Indies. He did not want America to be accused of shooting first. It is doubtful if it even entered his head that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbour, let alone create a set ofcircumstances to allow them to do so.

It must also be borne in mind that the Presi­dent was never shown Intelligence intercepts deal­ing with clandestine matters, so he was unaware of the overwhelming evidence of Japanese interest in Hawaii. The material shown him he always read very quickly, while trying to fathom the Japanese thinking (always a a difficult task). Sometimes he could not spare much time on his intercept pouch. One morning, when he could have been studying it, he spent studying the budget with the Treasurer. Another time, with Intelligence pouring into Washington, he went south to dine with the patients in a hopsital and had to be brought back.


You are all probably a little fed up with ex­hortations for Journal contributions, if you con­tribute we would not have to keep at you. We are due to go to print in mid-February and, so far. only one article. Ship Handling, Technical Topics, Classic Signals and 1 Was There When columns are dry. With over 250 members we should be able to do better. Whilst away from Service pressures on Christmas leave why not spend a short period pro­ducing something of benefit to the Institute as we do not want the Journal to die.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute- Page I 7

Objectivity in Ship Procurement

By LIEUTENANT COMMANDER C. J. SKINNER. RAN An address to the Sydney Chapter, 21st July, 1976


The procurement of ships to replace ageing escorts and patrol boats is now an urgent matter that has already gone too far for an optimum solu­tion. This essay proposes the everyday use of systems analysis in such RAN decision-making.

Operations research (OR) and scientific business management (BM) techniques are discussed to a certain depth in officer 'post-graduate' educational activities including OETC (1), staff courses and Defence Systems Management courses. The term 'systems analysis' (SA) is familiar to most service-ment, yet the application of the scientific discipline on which these techniques are founded, has largely been left to the brains in Defence Central and to OR-specialist establishments like CSE. WRE and RANRL. (2)

While the applicability of OR, BM and SA is broad, there is now possibly the most urgent ap­plication yet for the RAN to employ these most useful techniques. In addition the subject matter also presents a convenient opportunity to move toward increasing familiarity and employment of SA techniques by RAN serviccment in their every­day work.

Replacement of Naval Ships

As the title suggests, 1 refer to the matter of naval surface-combatant re placement. Originally the DDL project was expected to fDl the gaps in the RAN inventory as they occurred. However the decision-making involved in replacing the Daring-class in the next decade, and other units thereafter, has been complicated by:

the demise of the DDL,

the rapid escalation in 'sail-away' ship prices,

the increase in world deployment of surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), and

the added need to replace the attack-class patrol boats.

The time has gone to produce the best (optimal) solution. Admiral McNicoll put the situation suc­cinctly recently while discussing the options 'Much time has . . . been wasted and nothing can now prevent the naval weakness that is already built into the 1980s.. .'(3)

Page 18-Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

The Options for Replacements

Formerly replacements for DDs and DEs were considered on a one-for-one basis or better. Then with costs rising, and changes in Australia's political and strategic situation, the option to consider smaller and cheaper ships of about 1200 tonnes (corvettes) was added. The selection of the FFG-7 for the first buy was clearly a compromise between these two; on the one hand the FFG-7 meets only three of the four stated requirements for escorts (4); on the other the size and manning and hence cost are much greater than those for the corvettes.

Patrol Boats

The age and depleted numbers of the Attack-class patrol boats, allied with their proven effective­ness in the surveillance role, indicated a clear need for replacement action to begin. In addition D of D(Navy) have clearly anticipated the division of craft of this size into two roles-attack and patrol -as discussed by recent writers. (5)(6)The procure­ment of pure patrol craft is proceeding and since these craft have limited combat capability they may be excluded from further discussion; although the proposal by Jones (7) for the building of patrol craft that can be converted instantaneously to attack craft has much merit.


Lieutenant Commander Christopher John Skinner was bom in England in 1943. He entered the RANC, Jervis Bay in 1959, graduating in 1962. After a year at sea as a midshipman he proceeded to the UK for undergraduate studies in electrical engineering and a further period of WE application studies. Returning to Australia in 1967 he served in HMAS Parramatta and then, after courses in the U.S.A., in HMAS Hobart. After two yean of secondment to the then Department of Supply, working at WRE, he returned to the U.S.A. for courses leading to his present employment in HMAS Perth. Lieutenant Commander Skinner has main­tained an interest in the application of modem business management in the RAN, and has com­pleted several units towards the award of a Master of Business Administration degree, including the application of Systems Analysis and Operations Research.


Continuum of Options

Decisions regarding attack craft, probably SSM-armed, have not yet been made pending the defin­ition of their role. The field is wide open however; Grazebrook discusses a size range from 60 to 1000 tonnes, which verges on the 1200 tonne corvette option. Thus the reequipment of surface combat­ants must look at a continuum of options from 60 (hydrofoil) to 4500 tonnes (DDL).

Across this continuum discussion has waxed mainly for or against the extremes, both camps considering the corvette option as an acceptable compromise.

On the one hand the 'larger' case stresses that Australia's strategic and geopolitical situation demand range and endurance. On the other, the cost differential between the extremes indicates we could have many more units if they are smaller. The Head of Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU recently stated '. . . the RAN should buy sophisticated missile-firing patrol craft before patrol frigates ... fifteen patrol craft can be bought for the price of a destroyer.'(8)

This paper is not intended to beg the question; rather it attempts to demonstrate a means of objective consideration.


The method chosen is 'Linear Programming' (LP)-a rather undescriptive term for a set of dis­ciplined methods for choosing the best compromise, or in the parlance the optimal solution. Objective Function. The key to LP is the choice of an appropriate objective function. The most obvi­ous is 'best value for money', unhappily this is too

imprecise until we define "value'. So far 1 have alluded to five characteristics that have some part in "value'-range, endurance, number of hulls, com­bat capability and cost (here is meant total life or 'through' cost which includes all maintenance costs for ship, personnel, combat systems and support infra-structure).

We may then define the following parameters:

r ■ range or radius of action in nautical miles

e = endurance in days

x = number of hulls

c = combat capability or fighting effectiveness (non-dimensional factor)

d = cost in 1976 5M and our overall 'value' we will call Utility U where

U = f(r.e,x.c,d) Our objective in this case will be to maximise U subject to certain constraints caused by the scarcity of resources.

Simplification of the Objective Function (OF).

When there are many defined parameters the process becomes so unwieldy that:

  • only a computer can produce the solution, and

  • invalid assumptions are difficult to perceive. Some years ago the Harvard Business School com­mented that the best PERT network were those that were simple enough to be manipulated with­out a computer. The same may be said about many SA problems. Thus a most important function is to simplify the objective function as far as possible by making certain explicit assumptions. Often one variable is a function of another so one can be excluded.

Journal of the Australian Naval Inttttute-Page 19


Assumption 1. The endurance of other factors will Constraint 2. The maximum force is limited by the

always be greater than that implied by the radius number of men available M where

of action, that is e 2 Ar eqn I M = mx eqn 7

thus endurance may be excluded from further Constraint 3. The maximum force that can be pro-
consideration, cured is limited by the money available for initial

Assumption 2. For a given tonnage of ship the procurement p=px eqn g

range r and combat capability c are inversely pro- Since t, p,m are constrained then V is now

portions]; in other words increasing one implies a h(x,r, c) eqn 9

reduction in the other. Thus we may define a new However by assumption2 r and c are related thus

variable t = tonnaae in Uiddci where U=j(x,r) eqn 10

t = Brc - eqn 2 or V = k(X] c) eqn 11

Assumption 3. The through life cost d is a function Since r is more easily obtained we will use equation

of three parameters, namely: 10 and assume that the relationship is linear that is

the initial procurement (sailaway) cost; defined U = Grx eqn 12

as p in 1976 SM, We should stop at this point to consider this rela-
cost of maintenance of ship and combat systems; tionship. What we are saying is that our best value
assume that this cost is proportional to ton- js obtained from the maximum number of miles
nage.and covered by the total force-put in these terms a
cost of maintenance and training of the crew and certain logic will hopefully be apparent. Addition-
shore-support personnel assume this cost is ally we have said under assumption 2 that if we are
proportional to crew size more worried about combat effectiveness then since

-ru ... i - a j. a j. a force tonnage is limited, we may still consider our

Jlius we may say d-di+dT + d^ ..... r r ...

l * J objective in terms of force miles since there is a

= Dp + Et + Fm . . eqn 4 fixed relationship between range and combat
where m = number of men in the crew of one ship. effectiveness (tonnage being equal).
Thus we can now say that Statement of the Problem. In this case the variables
U-g(t,p, m.x.r.c) eqn 5 will be the number of hulls x since we wUI be con-
Now certain of these parameters are subject to sidering the uti]jty of , force contajnjng varying
constraints, in particular: number of known ^p^pes. Nevertheless other
Constraint I. The maximum torce that can be paranieters could be made to vary if one wished,
maintained is limited by the dockyard and other Specifically we will consider three types of ship:
infrastructure available and is proportional to force . 3500 tonne ,ong range escorts sjmjlar to the

tonna8e FFG-7 (subscript 1)

T=tx eqn 6 • 1200 tonne corvettes (subscript 2), and

500 tonne attack craft (subscript 3). Page 20-Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Objective Function: maximize


rlx1+r2x2 + r3x3

Subject to the following constraints:

llxl + t2x2 + t3x3 &


m.Xi + m2x2 + m3x3 £ Mmax PjX| + p-jX2 + P3X3 £ Pmax

. eqn 13

.eqn 14

.eqn 15

eqn 16

Plugging in the Figures. The reader will undoubt­edly wonder about the accuracy of the figures used in the following analysis; the truth is that they are not intended to be accurate-merely representative in order to show the method at work.

Table 1 - Values used in the example.;





Attack Craft



tonnes x 100










procurement cost/ship


1976 SM x 10






naut miles x 100




combat effectiveness irr


from t and r

relative values




Table 2 - Values of the Constraints

Constraint 1 T max is equal to ten ships of DE/DD/DDG average size, say 3850 tonnes, that is

10x38.5 = 385 (tonnes x 100) Constraint 2 M max is equal to the crews of ten ships each with a crew of 30, that is

10x300 = 3000 Constraint 3 P max is equal to the cost of ten replacements by the largest type, that is

10x2O = 2O0(1976SMx 10) The following demonstrates the means of obtaining a solution by longhand methods:

Maximise OF 40xj + 25x2 + 6x3 . . . eqn 13

Subject to

T = 35x, + 12x2 + 5x3 & 385. eqn 14

M=185x, + 120x2 + 30x3 - 3000. eqn 15

P= 20x, + I2x2 + 2x3 4 200 eqn 16









Pmax-P OF




































































































































523 optimal














Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Page 21

At this stage it is interesting to impose a new con­straint, namely that the number of escorts must be at least two, that is x,£. 2 starting from step 14:

14 4 4 36 17 700 0 476

  1. 3 5 40 20 645 0 485

  2. 2 6 44 23 590 0 494

  3. 2 5 50 5 530 0 505

  4. 2 4 56 -13 optimal

  5. 2 4 53 2 560 6 498

Thus the result now is that a penalty of 523 -505 = 18 x 100 force miles has been invoked. Put another way the opportunity cost of constraining Xi has been 1800 less miles of force coverage. Naturally this figure has no more significance than the figures and relationships used throughout-it is brought out to indicate how one can investigate the sensitivity of the solution to new requirements.

Luckily LP has available shorthand methods using matrix algebra to carry out the above. In three iterations one reaches the optimal result of Xj =0, x2 = 6.39, x3 = 61.67, Mmax-M = 556.1 and OF ■ 529.7; there is a further development of LP called Integer Programming which takes much longer but does give the result we obtained by longhand. In practice though LP provides a rapid means to arrive at a close answer and then a small amount of investigation reveals the best integer answer.

Change of Objective Function. The reader may well feel that the relative utility of the escort vis a vis the attack craft is much greater than the 40:6 ratio we have used .provided the constraints remain the same it is only necessary to recalculate the values of the OF to save a lot of work in arriving at a new optimal solution.

In addition the objective function may call for the mimimisation of some variables, or some vari-ables may not appear in ail of the constraints (as in the second example above)-these and other require­ments can be accommodated in the shorthand method. One major limitation however is that the expressions must be linear-non-linear programming is under development but is sufficiently complex to require both a computer and expert practitioners. My earlier statement that the simpler the formula­tion the better is thus particularly relevant.


The pronounced preference of the result for smaller ships was quite unintentional and is only as relevant as are the formulation of the problem and the constraints and assumptions. The writer form­ulated the problem to obtain an insight into the matter. The point here is that one does not need

Page 22-Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

any very specialised aptitude in order to do just this. Nor is it a means of baffling the layman. A properly done formulation of the problem must be argued just as cogently as a staff paper, with exten­sive justifications of assumptions (lacking here un­fortunately in the interests of space). In fact the final manipulation of numbers is by far the least important feature of the method.

There is no barrier to the use of this and other techniques of systems analysis in everyday applica­tions in the RAN, save a sad lack of awareness of their existence. This gap in our education should be filled as soon as possible.


  1. Officers Extension Tutorial Course- pre-staff course study by correspondence; mandatory for RAAF selection for staff course, optional for RAN.

  2. Central Studies Establishment, Canberra. Weapons Research Establishment, Salisbury, SA. RAN Research Laboratory, Sydney.

  3. McNicoll, Vice Admiral Sir Alan. KBE.CB.GM. 'The Escort Game*. Pacific Defence Reporter, Vol 2, No 10. April 1976. page 16.

  4. Essentially: two helo's, SAM, SSM, medium-range gun; the FFC-7 mounts a 76mm gun that does not meet all the requirements. SeeGrazebrook, A. W. "Escorts, The Next Generation*. Pacific Defence Reporter. March 1976.

  5. Grazebrook, A. W. 'Attack and Patrol Craft*. Pacific Defence Reporter, Vol 2 No. 11. May 1976 page 30.

  6. Coles, LCDR RAN. "The Patrol Boat in Contin­ental Defence'. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, Vol 2 No. 1. February 1976. page 21.

  7. Ibid.

  8. O'Neill, Dr. Robert. 'The Defence of Australia ... 3. A need for new ideas, smart weapons'. The Sydney Morning Herald. February 20,1976. page 6.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Brabb, George J. Introduction to Quantitative Management. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Sydney. 1968.

Cleland, David I. and King, William R- Systems Analysis and Project Management. McGraw-Hill. Sydney. 1968.

Horowitz, Ira. An introduction to Quantitative Business Management. 2nd Ed. McGraw-Hill. Sydney. 1972.

United States Naval Institute. Fundamentals of Naval Operations Analysis. USN1. Annapolis. 1970.

Proposed Projected Cruiser for Australia

This article is a reproduction of letters and a document pertaining to ship procurement

in the J9th century. It is printed as a comparison between what happens now (see

previous artilce) and what happened then.

The Honorable.

The Minister for Defence


With reference to the plans of cruisers design­ed by Sir William Armstrong & Co. which have been forwarded to me for report. I have the honor to stare thai I consider the vessels shown in plans A and B. are, generally speaking, well suited to the defence of the port and would also be efficient vessels on the high seas, though I should prefer a hcaviei class of vessel such as proposed in my report of the 2Qth June last, but of which I have heard nothing further.

As I have always endeavoured to show that if Melbourne is ever attacked it will be by a foe thai has fully estimated the risks, and that con­sequently the attack will be made by a force that at any rate would be superior to the preseni float­ing defences, so that probably powerfully protected cruisers, and possibly an ironclad or so would be sent; and therefore any increase to our ships should be of a class able to cope with all comers.

Nevertheless the class of ships sent to me for report would undoubtedly be a valuable addition to the defences, as they possess a powerful arma­ment, considerable speed, and light draught of water.

Design A I consider the best, the armament being heavier, though I do not approve of the Galling guns, and consider they should be replaced with Nordenfelts. The position of the pivot guns appears to admit of but little depression, and it is difficult lo imagine how the foremost ones can be fired right ahead without damage to the forepart of the ship, though undoubtedly slight alterations could rectify them.

The square sails and yards, except for the passage out. should be abolished as useless hamper, and only such poles or masts retained as would be required for signalling purposes.

It is not slated what proportion of ammuni­tion per gun these vessels will carry, but it is of

great Importance, as all the guns are rapid consumers, and plenty of magazine and shell room space will be required.

The boats appear to be of the same type as those supplied to the gunboats Victoria and Albert, and if so, should be replaced by better ones

The arrangement for compartments, steering gear, protection of engines and boilers appear to be as good as could be arranged for vessels of the class.

The complement required for Class A will be at leasl 150 officers and men all told.

I have the honor lo be Sir/-

Your obedient servant
HMS Nelson A. B. Masters

26th October 1888

Elswick Works Newcastle upon Tyne

22nd July. 1887 Sir James Lorimer.

Dear Sir.

Referring to the interview the writer had with you and General Steward with reference to cruisers for the colony of Victoria, we have now the pleasure to forward herewith copies of the de­signs we have prepared, together with a description and an estimate shewing the cost of the vessesl

Captain Noble is to be in London on Monday next, and will be found at the Athenaeum Club. Should you require any further information he will be happy to wait upon you to afford it.

We may add thai as the order for these ves­sels cannot be given immediately, the prices must be taken as approximate only.

We are. dear Sir.

Yours faithfully.

W Noble

Journal of the A ustralian Naval Institute Page 23

Elswick Works Newcastle upon Tyne

July 22nd 1887


To accompany our letter of this date to

Sir James Lorimer

Design A oper

tracing 4127

Dexicn B u per tracing 4128



Hull & engines








Torpedoes A gear




Electric Lighting




Note: the above prices are only approximate.




The accompanying drawings No. 4127, 4128, and 4129, shewing alternative designs for a PROTECTED CRUISER have been prepared to fulfil the conditions laid down by Sir James Lorimer during his recent visit. The designs are named A and B respectively. They differ from one another chiefly in the armament carried; the slight difference in the size being due to differences in the weights of these armaments. Principal Dimensions, etc.

The following are approximately the princi­pal dimensions of the two vessels:

Design A Design B Length between perpendiculars l95'0" 190'0"

Breadth 33'0" 33'0"

Draft (mean) 11'6" 11'6"

Displacement (about) 1040 tons 1020 tons

Indicated Horse Power 2600 2600

Speed in knots (with forced 16 16


On the midship section tracing No 4129, which may be taken as applying to both vessels, will be found the principal particulars of the struc­tural arrangements. These will be equal in every respect to those of a vessel of a similar class in the British Navy and will provide ample strength for carrying the guns, machinery, etc.

Page 24 -Journal of the Australian Nival Institute

Protective Deck

The disposition of the protective deck and the thickness of the plates are also shewn on the midship section. It will be seen that on the inclined portions or slopes of the deck the plates in com­bination are 2H inches thick, and on the horizontal portion of the deck, which is less liable to be hit fairly the plates are 1 & inches thick.

The longitudinal extension of the deck is indicated on the profile views (Tracings No. 4127, 4128). From these it will be seen that the deck will reach over all the length occupied by engines, boilers, and magazines at about the same level, the horizontal portions being about 9 inches above the water-line-at the extremities the deck will fall below the water-line as indicated; the forward end supporting the ram and the after end sheltering the steering gear.

Above the protective deck the coal bunkers are arranged to assist the defence.

General Features of Armament and Accomodation These are indicated fully on the plans (Trac­ings No. 4127 & 4128). The high forecastle and poop add considerably to the seaworthiness and accomodation and they also allow the bow and stern chase guns to be lifted to a great height above water which adds greatly to the fighting efficiency of the ships in a seaway. Both officers and men will have excellent quarters with natural light and ventilation.

As regards watertight sub-division this has been carried out to a great extent. There are seven transverse watertight bulkheads and two independ­ent engine rooms besides numerous minor compart­ments, magazine, shell, and store rooms,etc.below the protective deck. Above the protective deck the coal bunkers are built into numerous water-tight cellular compartments which will contribute to­wards the buoyancy and stability to a very great extent if the ships are injured in action. Disposition of Guns & Torpedoes

The arrangements for the two designs are as follows:

Tracing- Design A- No. 4127 Two 6 inch B.L. Guns mounted on a twin platform

on the Forecastle. One 6 inch B.L. Gun on a platform on the Poop. Four 40 Pr. Rapid-firing Guns mounted on spon-sons on the broadside so as to have consider­able range of fire. Eight 3 Pr. Rapid-firing Guns as shewn on Tracing

No.4127. Four Gatlings-two in the military top and two on

the broadside. Two Torpedo tubes are provided-one firing right forward through the stern and the other directly aft through the stem frame. Stowage space has been reserved for the bodies of six torpedoes and magazine space for their ex­plosive heads.



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